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INTRODUCTION 
 
This report to the Low Pay Commission (LPC) provides an international review of the 
literature relating to minimum wages and the youth labour market.  It covers literature 
on 12 countries – the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Belgium, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Finland and the UK.  We had originally 
sought to include Japan in our review but found no way of locating external experts 
willing to take part. We were also told that this issue is not commonly addressed in 
the Japanese literature. Instead we included Portugal (not in our original list of 
countries agreed with the LPC), where some relevant literature was found.  We also 
found and report on literature concerning Finland. 
 
The literature was collected and analysed using a modified form of systematic review 
by a team of academics drawn from staff at the universities of Greenwich and 
Middlesex.  In addition, country experts were recruited and used as external 
contributors/advisors. Systematic review is an approach to reviewing a large body of 
literature with a view to creating a synthesis; originally developed in medical science, 
it seeks to evaluate where the weight of opinion lies on how best to treat a particular 
medical condition. Certain aspects of the approach were adopted in our own meta-
analysis. We created a review protocol for all reviewers that asked standard 
questions about each publication reviewed.  This protocol was created by the project 
directors and agreed with the reviewers and the LPC. Overall, we have used a 
process that is transparent to other researchers, the central principle of systematic 
review.  However, reaching a synthesis of the definitive type aimed at in the medical 
sciences has not been possible because of the international nature of our review and 
the way that different institutional arrangements affect the impact of minimum wages. 
Therefore we reviewed all the relevant peer-reviewed literature we could find 
covering the last fifteen years.  We did not exclude any works falling within this 
definition, but in the text we indicate where we think work unreliable as a basis for 
policy.   
 
Our report is structured in three main parts. First we present a brief review of the 
theoretical debates concerning the relationship between the youth labour market and 
minimum wages. Second, we discuss in detail the methodology used in reviewing 
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literature. The third and central chapter reviews the relevant literature for each of the 
12 countries, providing in each case first a contextual section detailing the 
background to the minimum wage system, the particular arrangements for young 
workers and then the findings from the relevant articles. Complex webs of 
institutional arrangements surround our issue.  We have therefore divided our review 
of countries into two main groups – those which are commonly described as liberal 
market economies and those that can be described as coordinated market 
economies (Hall and Soskice, 2000). Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are 
characterised by the fact that markets play a much larger role in regulating them than 
in Co-ordinated Market Economies (CMEs) where the state and other institutions 
play a strong co-ordinating role.  In our terms, this is illustrated by the tendency for 
minimum wages to be set by collective bargaining or a powerful tripartite body in 
CMEs rather than by state-led mechanisms as in LMEs.  We have included the USA, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK in the former category. In the latter 
category, we include France, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands and 
Finland. 
 
Table 1a provides basic data relating to the youth labour market for each country. 
Table 1b provides overall facts and figures on the minimum wage arrangements for 
young people in each country.  We also present as an appendix, a summary table of 
key literature reviewed (Table 2), showing employment elasticities where available. 
Dr Denise Hawkes has provided a Technical Appendix explaining the main technical 
approaches used to measure the impact of minimum wages on labour markets. 
Some readers may wish to read this before reading the country reports, to help them 
recognise particular approaches.  However, we include it as an appendix since it 
also draws some conclusions about the approaches used.  
 
Reviewing literature requires some evaluation of the wider framework of scholarly 
publication.  It is important to note at the outset that Doucouliagos and Stanley 
(2009), in a recent rigorous meta-regression analysis of the US literature on 
minimum wage effects, argue that the nature of articles accepted for publication in 
scholarly journals shows a bias towards neo-classical findings.  To quote from their 
abstract:  
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‘The minimum-wage effects literature is contaminated by publication selection bias, 
which we estimate to be slightly larger than the average reported minimum-wage 
effect. Once this publication selection is corrected, little or no evidence of a negative 
association between minimum wages and employment remains.’ 
 
There may also be a tendency for journals to accept papers showing positive rather 
than neutral results on our subjects; since many of the results reported are on the 
margins of statistical significance, this is also relevant to our review.   
 
The literature from the USA concerning the employment effects of minimum wage 
systems upon the youth labour market is most voluminous; it therefore looms large in 
this report.  As we discuss, this may reflect a particular interest in this issue in that 
country and also the size of the American academy compared to that in European 
countries.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The literature review covers scholarly literature from twelve countries, examining the 
impact of minimum wages on youth employment, schooling and training. It was 
conducted by a sizeable team of specialist reviewers, which included country experts 
external who acted as advisers to the review team.   
 
The size of employment effects from the introduction of or increases in minimum 
wages for young people in general are extremely small and on the margins of 
statistical significance in the great majority of studies surveyed. The employment 
elasticity for 16-17 year-olds in 2003 in Hyslop and Stillman (2007), in their New 
Zealand study was -0.1 to -0.2, a typical result for those studies arguing that a 
significant effect exists. There is some evidence that negative employment effects 
where they exist may disappear as the worker ages.  
 
The impact of minimum wages upon the youth labour market is more likely to be 
negative where there is no separate subminimum (minima) for younger workers as 
for example in Spain. 
 
There is some evidence that the very small employment impacts can be mitigated 
and in some cases be positive if the subminimum rate is set at the appropriate level. 
The prudent approach taken by the UK LPC might be seen as helpful in mitigating 
the effect of youth minimum wages on employment.   
 
There is also some evidence that increases in 16-17 year old rates do have some 
effect on the extent of their employment as shown in several studies reviewed.  
 
Where wide support exists in society for minimum wages, employers rarely take 
advantage of suspensions of minimum wages for younger workers even when given 
the opportunity to do so as shown in the Finnish case.  
 
The method by which the minimum wage is set is relevant, with systems which set 
rates by collective bargaining less likely to experience negative employment effects.   
9 
 
Minimum wages for young people may also have a less negative or indeed nil impact 
where there are strong labour market interventions by Government to support 
employment for young workers.    
 
There is only a relatively small literature on effects on schooling.  In the UK and the 
USA, there is very little evidence that minimum wages for 16-17 year olds have 
exerted a negative influence on continued school participation. The legal school 
minimum leaving age is an important determinant of continued participation.  
 
There are contradictory estimates of the effect of minimum wages on training, partly 
because effects are very small.  
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL DEBATES 
 
 Government policies: between national competitiveness and equity 
In the developed world, governments have increasingly followed policies based on 
arguments about ‘globalisation’ and the development of an ‘information economy’. 
Both are argued to be linked to national economic prosperity. The argument is that 
there is an over-arching need therefore to increase investments in education and 
training. This in turn, it is suggested, requires them to ensure that incentives to 
young people to remain in education and vocational training are sufficiently high for 
them to do so. 
 
Governments in the developed world, and especially in Europe, whilst firmly 
embracing the ‘life-long learning’ concept have also in practice adopted policies that 
emphasise heavy initial investment in education and training. In effect, this is the 
German model. In this model, the emphasis is on the early stages of the life course 
when young people are provided with a solid general vocational training that allows 
them later to have only top-up or up-dating training provided by employers. Costs are 
borne by the state, young people and their families and employers. In recent years, 
the financial burden in Germany has shifted away from employers, underlining the 
importance put on the subject by the state.    
 
Governments have to consider societal norms in relation to the appropriate and 
equitable treatment of young people. These are especially strong in relation to those 
young people at the lower end of the age range, who are making the transition from 
what is perceived as the more sheltered educational and home environments where 
parents have more oversight possibilities, to more exposed situations in workplaces.  
Therefore governments have to balance their wish for incentives to be high for young 
people to stay on in education and training (arguing for no or low minimum wages for 
young people, or for graded minimum wages for different ages) with societal wishes 
to protect vulnerable young people from exploitation (arguing for a minimum wage 
set at a higher level or simply at the adult rate).    
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They have also had to take into account the possible consequences of creating a 
specific youth minimum wage or wages for the legitimacy of their wider legislation.  
Creating special rates for specific age groups raises issues in relation to widespread 
legislation trying to prevent discrimination against employees on the grounds of their 
age.   
 
It is not only the legitimacy of the governmental legislation that it is at stake, but also 
that of the policy of a specific rate for younger workers. Thus, if specific rates for 
young workers at a specific point mean that they become especially attractive to 
employers, then that may in turn displace older workers from these jobs. Whether in 
fact it does so is largely related in turn to the imputed productivity of the workers in 
question (generally assumed to be lower for younger workers although in reality this 
may not universally be the case). This also shows how the issue of special minimum 
wage rates for young workers cannot be separated from discussion of wider effects 
on the working population more generally. 
 
Governments have a wider concern with those young people who have not 
succeeded in entering paid employment referred to as NEETs, ‘Not in Education, 
Employment or Training’, in the UK, but a group which is similarly of concern in 
Europe more widely. The prospect is of the development of a grouping that in effect 
‘drops out’ not only of employment but also become divorced from social norms 
more widely. The phenomenon of the ‘discouraged’ unemployed who stop seeking 
work rather than face constant rejection is well-known to both sociologists and 
economists. Thus, in time they may become ‘unemployable’ and even a source of 
social discontent and reduced social cohesion. In this sense, minimum wages may 
provide a ‘pull’ factor raising their incentives to seek work, with the simultaneous 
advantage that it holds out the prospect of removing their demand for out of work 
benefits.    
 
Thus, the position for governments has become one of balancing a number of 
factors that are at least in tension and on occasion in direct contradiction.       
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 Employment effects: the arguments 
When discussing the consequences of the introduction of a minimum wage on the 
labour market, attention tends to focus mainly on the employment effect. In fact, for 
some time the available evidence has concentrated squarely on this aspect. 
 
Neo-classical economic arguments suggest that labour markets are subject to the 
same dynamics as other markets, i.e. that young workers may be ‘priced out’ of the 
market by minimum wages, especially if they are set at high levels. Neumark and 
Wascher (2008) hypothesise that minimum wage increases disproportionately 
reduce employment opportunities for teenagers who have already dropped out of 
school, finding that they did in fact operate in this way. Yet the obvious sample bias 
contained in this study seems to obviate the results; school drop-outs seem unlikely 
to have attributes attractive to employers.  
 
A further negative result is also envisaged by those operating within this framework. 
The ‘pricing out’ of younger workers will mean that there will likely be a replacement 
effect as employers will then turn to older workers. Older workers may have a 
number of competitive advantages. They are considered almost automatically more 
attractive to employers by virtue of their greater life and work experience. They may 
have both general personal qualities and industry-specific knowledge that will mean 
that they will be preferred to younger workers. They may require less training and 
less supervision than their younger counterparts. Their productivity may be higher as 
a result.   
 
The contrary argument is that younger workers may in fact demonstrate a number of 
positive attributes that make them more attractive to those employers with specific 
requirements. The first of these fits into the strong and very widespread tendency for 
employers to seek increased time and task flexibility from workers. Younger workers 
may show more flexibility in these areas. Further, they may also have positive 
attributes in relation to other significant aspects of the employer’s business, for 
example by matching customer profiles thereby enhancing customer identification 
with products and services. Finally, they may meet a need for employers to ensure a 
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steady supply of employees and later managers acculturated from an early age into 
the specific requirements of their business.   
 
Looking only at employment effects provides only a partial assessment of the 
relationship between the minimum wage and teenage employment. Attaining a better 
understanding of the consequences of minimum wage legislation requires analysis 
from a wider perspective, and looking at other individuals whose decisions are likely 
to be affected by the minimum wage. The review of literature on France in this report 
makes similar and further points along these lines. A wider focus is particularly 
important when dealing with teenage workers because their employment decisions 
are closely related to other decisions such as education and on-the-job training.  
 
A further argument is that there is likely to be a negative effect where specific rates 
are set for particular ages, as in the case of the British 16-17 year old rate. This may 
lead to dismissal on leaving the lower rate. Conversely, in the case of overtime and 
where little added value comes from an older worker, the 16-17 year olds may 
receive preferential overtime allocation.  
 
 Training effects 
Neoclassical theory predicts that in perfectly competitive markets a minimum wage 
will have a negative impact on employment and on-the-job training, as well as a 
negative effect on workers’ earnings. Hashimoto (1982) identified two ways in which 
the minimum wage is likely to affect on-the-job training: given the negative effect on 
employment, the minimum wage will prevent workers from finding a job and from 
receiving any training. For those who find employment, the opportunities of receiving 
training decrease because the firm cannot offset training costs by offering a lower 
wage. This issue becomes more worrying in the light of recent research showing that 
unskilled workers are less likely than skilled employees to receive training during 
their working life (O’Mahony and Peng 2010). This can have negative long term 
effects on productivity and innovation.  
 
The fixing of a minimum wage floor for young workers may have an effect on 
employers’ preparedness to train them. The neo-classical argument is again simply 
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based on total costs: if wage costs are raised, then employers will seek to reduce 
costs in other areas. This in turn, it has been suggested, may have longer-term 
consequences for these workers’ human capital in that it may reduce their capacity 
to benefit from training later in their working life (see for example the various works 
by Neumark and Wascher reviewed below).   
 
Contrary arguments have been put by those who argue that neo-classical 
assumptions about labour markets as perfectly competitive are inappropriate. 
Minimum wages may therefore actually increase the amount of training of all types 
that employers are prepared to undertake, including general training. Where labour 
has a specified minimum cost, this may raise employers’ propensity to invest in 
them, since turnover may be reduced because labour is more easily retained.  In 
short, the level of ‘employer-employee interdependence’ as Whitley (1999) describes 
it is increased.  This type of effect may be greater in some industries than in others.  
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999, 2003) for example showed that although minimum 
wages had negative training effects in lower wage industries they have the opposite 
in higher wage industries.  British evidence from Arulampalam et al (2004) showing 
that the National Minimum Wage (NMW) raised levels of training is discussed by 
Neumark and Wascher (2007) but dismissed on methodological grounds.   
 
Neumark and Wascher (1998) also suggest that the negative training effects of 
minimum wages, which they argue exist, may stretch beyond the period in which the 
worker receives them. Thus, those workers who receive the minimum wage are 
provided with a weaker basis for later training (and we would add may become 
‘training discouraged’). However, low paid and low skilled workers have a low 
probability of receiving further training in any case. This derives from a vicious circle 
of their own attitudes to education more widely (as in Neumark and Wascher’s 
sample of school drop-outs, a group which seems likely to epitomise our point) and 
employer attitudes to training low-skilled workers operating in symbiosis with the 
worker attitudes.  
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 Participation in education effects  
An argument exists that minimum wages can pull school students out of education.  
Schooling decisions are particularly relevant when looking at young workers in the 
15-19 age bracket and whether these young people are more likely to leave school 
following an increase in the minimum wage is an important question.  Leighton and 
Mincer (1981) argued that the effect of the minimum wage on schooling can be 
positive if additional investment in education increases the workers’ returns above 
the minimum wage.  However, the immediate attraction of higher wages could 
induce young workers to leave education and enter the labour market. These 
decisions are naturally affected by sociological considerations such as family 
attitudes and individual backgrounds as well as the economic cycle. Sociological 
considerations are likely to be relevant here, with families more or less concerned 
and able to invest in education (Ehrenberg and Marcus, 1982).   
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
  
 Principles and methods of the literature review 
The method adopted draws on the principles of systematic review without using any 
version of that approach fully. Systematic review is an approach to reviewing a large 
body of literature with a view to creating a synthesis; originally developed in medical 
science, it seeks to evaluate where the weight of opinion lies on how best to treat a 
particular medical condition. Certain aspects of the approach were adopted in our 
own meta-analysis. Thus, we have used country experts to inform our literature 
search from its origins to the final result, an approach borrowed from systematic 
review. We created a review protocol for all reviewers, that asks standard questions 
about each publication reviewed, seeking to accord some methodologically sound 
works more priority in our analysis.   
 
 This protocol was created by the project directors and agreed with the LPC. For 
each work reviewed, a form was filled in by a reviewer and posted on a shared drive. 
Overall, we have used a process that is transparent to other researchers, the central 
principle of systematic review. However, reaching a definitive synthesis of the sort 
aimed at in the medical sciences has not been possible because of the international 
nature of our inquiry. The very different economic, national legal and institutional 
frameworks existing in the many countries surveyed here means that simply 
because of the differences between medical science and the social sciences we are 
unable to replicate the systematic review process entirely faithfully.    
 
 Selection of works for inclusion in the review 
The works for review had to be selected from a wide range of literature.  All of the 
literature that was initially scanned is to be found in our bibliography and we hope 
that the inclusive bibliography to be found there, while in no way exhaustive, will be 
useful to other researchers.  Those that were chosen to form the core of our review 
are posted at the following web address: 
http://www.4shared.com/account/dir/GgkmTl96/sharing.html?rnd=87 .  Our starting 
points for identifying this literature were as follows. First, existing overviews (such as 
those conducted by the OECD (1998) and Neumark and Wascher, (2007 and 2008)) 
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were trawled for their references. In addition, word searches using the terms ‘young 
workers, young employees, youth, minimum wages, training, education, 
unemployment, employment’ were entered into academic and business search 
engines.  These searches were carried out in English and supplemented by 
searches in other languages. The latter were conducted by native speaker members 
of the research team for all non-English speaking countries.   
 
Not all of the works identified were examined in detail, for several reasons.  Firstly, 
some of them did not meet minimum standards of rigour or data quality and were 
therefore not included for consideration. Secondly, there is a good deal of literature 
of a partisan nature on this subject, given its politicisation. We did not exclude all 
such literature from our bibliography, but we only entered it in the bibliography when 
it contained original empirical investigation. Thirdly, there was also the question of 
the boundaries of our subject. It could be argued, and we are sympathetic to the 
view, that the effects of minimum wages and their levels and operation on young 
people are difficult to separate from their effects on all employees. Thus, for 
example, if young workers are encouraged into the labour market by the level of a 
minimum wage, then older workers may be excluded by their competition. On the 
other hand, our project could not attempt to scrutinise all the literature on minimum 
wages for all of the countries surveyed since not only was this outside of our terms of 
reference, it would also be a substantial task requiring a much longer time frame to 
complete. A pragmatic solution was therefore adopted whereby works that explicitly 
mentioned young workers in their titles were always included, but where these works 
themselves referred centrally to more general works which we considered relevant to 
our specific question, we read these. Finally, there were many cases in which one 
article could be taken as representative of a particular project from which several 
articles were published.  We therefore sought to identify the most representative of 
these, to keep the project under control.   
 
 Establishment and operation of the research team 
The research team was drawn from Middlesex and Greenwich Universities’ Business 
Schools, together with one researcher who specialises in our subject currently 
working as a freelance researcher for the University of Greenwich. The team 
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consisted of 11 academics.  It was necessary to include academics with the 
appropriate languages to review literature not written in English, and this was done.   
 
Their disciplinary backgrounds were in the fields of industrial relations, sociology and 
economics. Since many of the papers were econometric and some team members 
felt less competent in that area, the three econometricians in the team were referred 
to when team members felt that was necessary. The research team noted that the 
almost exclusively econometric nature of the literature was an issue, since more 
sociological approaches were also felt to have something to offer especially when 
measuring the welfare benefits of minimum wages. In this sense, the project initiated 
a discussion which may well bear fruit in the future in the form of new work.    
 
The team met regularly; this allowed us to build a collective and critical approach to 
the reviewing process as well as facilitating information exchange and monitoring 
progress. The team had a central research administrator who provided an on-line 
project administration service to the project. As literature was identified, it was put on 
to the on-line database so that it could be accessed by all team members. Both 
these works and the reviewers’ completed protocols for them were made available to 
all researchers both on our team and on the other teams working on related LPC 
projects.   
 
The team was supplemented by external experts for most of the countries surveyed. 
These experts assisted the team in identifying key works at the beginning of the 
project, were available for consultation as it proceeded during mid 2010, and then 
saw and commented on the country drafts presented to them in August and 
September. These external experts also produced or commented on country 
updates for the team. We are very grateful to them.  
 
 Production of interim and final reports 
An interim progress report was made to LPC officers in late June 2010, immediately 
after a research team meeting, although the nature of the project was such that 
emerging findings were not then available since progress on reviewing country 
literature was uneven.   
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The building blocks of the final report were the completed protocols created by 
research team members. These were synthesised by both team members and the 
project directors.  Edited versions were checked back with their creators and also 
with the external country experts. The results were made available to the LPC in late 
September 2010, and presented to the LPC non-technical workshop on October 4. 
Adjustments were made to the final report immediately after the workshop following 
feedback from the LPC and in an iterative process from October through to mid-
February.  
 
We repeat that the bibliography and the reviewers’ completed protocols may be 
viewed at the following web address: 
http://www.4shared.com/account/dir/GgkmTl96/sharing.html?rnd=87 
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CHAPTER 3: COUNTRY REVIEWS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers the literature reviewed for each of the countries. We have 
divided our review of countries into two main groups – those which broadly have 
been described as liberal market economies (LMEs) and those that can be 
considered as coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2000). We 
have included Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA in the former 
category. In the latter grouping we include Belgium, France, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Finland.  We recognise the complexity that 
underlies this simple division; Australia, for example, shows some of the features of 
a CME in its co-ordinated wage system.  Nevertheless, we use it because the LMEs’ 
minimum wage systems share certain characteristics, usually showing specific youth 
rates.  Moreover, the coordinated market economies are characterised by higher 
levels of regulation more widely and in particular stronger regulation of redundancy, 
greatly impacting the effects considered here.   
 
 The country reviews require some contextualisation.  In 1998, as the OECD 
commented in its review of the literature on minimum wages (OECD 1998), while 
statutory minimum wages existed in 17 OECD countries, there were substantial 
differences in the way they were set and operated. Twelve years later, this remains 
the case. The main differences between the systems in different countries concern: 
the level of the minimum relative to average wages; the extent of differentiation by 
age or region; mechanisms for indexation; and the roles of governments and the 
social partners in setting them. In this report we are only concerned with the second 
of these – the degree to which minimum wages are differentiated by age (and where 
relevant, by region). Because our review is limited to one feature of the impact of 
minimum wages – the effects on the youth labour market – there are variations in 
both the quantity and quality of literature considered for each country. In some cases 
(e.g. the UK) we found limited literature dealing directly with this issue, although 
reference is made to other, more general research on the impact on employment 
which may provide relevant evidence. The most voluminous literature on this aspect 
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of minimum wages impact is from the USA, and we pay especially close attention to 
this because of its importance as a comparator.  
 
The OECD commented in its review that: ‘It is also difficult to make direct 
international comparisons because of differences in the way the incidence of 
minimum-wage work is measured and in the groups of workers covered by the 
statutory minimum’ (OECD 1998).  It appears, however, that the lower value of the 
minimum wage relative to average wages in the USA than in, for example France, is 
also reflected in a much lower proportion of all employees paid at the minimum wage 
or less. In general, the incidence of minimum wage work in all countries is highest 
among youth, women and part-time workers. These employees also tend to be 
concentrated in similar industries and in smaller rather than larger employing 
organisations. While young workers are disproportionately affected, significant 
numbers of older workers are also covered.  
 
There have been two attempts to produce cross-national comparative datasets. The 
OECD economists in 1998 constructed a comparative measure of the relative 
minimum wage by dividing the nominal minimum wage by the median earnings of 
full-time workers. This ratio was used in a set of regressions for seven to nine 
countries over the period 1975 to 1996. Using the employment-population ratio on 
the relative minimum wage; a business cycle control; institutional factors such as 
union density; the unemployment benefit replacement rate and the payroll tax rate; 
and fixed country and year effects; the analysis indicated overall negative and 
statistically significant disemployment effects for teenagers and negative and only 
marginally significant or insignificant effects for 20-24 year olds (OECD 1998).  The 
estimated elasticities for teenagers ranged from -0.07 to -0.41, with the larger 
estimates occurring when Portugal and Spain were excluded.  The OECD study 
included a few variables to account for institutional differences but in general the 
problem of comparing the impact of minimum wages across countries was seen as 
difficult.  
 
Neumark and Wascher (2004) made a second attempt to compare the effects across 
17 OECD countries, taking account of a variety of labour market policies and 
institutions. Using standard panel data for employment, including a one-year lag of 
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the minimum wage relative to the average wage, the regressions’ ‘consistently point 
to negative effects of the minimum wage on employment’ (Neumark and Wascher 
2007).  When the model was augmented with controls for institutional differences, 
they found that the strongest evidence of a negative effect of the minimum wage 
upon teenage or youth employment appears only in countries without a separate 
youth rate. They also found evidence, although weaker, that minimum wages do not 
result in employment losses in countries in which minimum wages are set by some 
form of collective bargaining process.  They also found that minimum wages had 
more adverse effects where labour regulation was more restrictive although, 
conversely, there is strong evidence that the disemployment effects of the minimum 
wage are more muted where employment protection is high.  This also applies where 
there are strong proactive labour market policies to combat unemployment.  Hence, 
institutional differences are clearly important.  In a forthcoming report for the Low 
Pay Commission, Dolton and Bondibene (2010) also cover this research area. 
 
In Table 1a below, we provide a summary of the different arrangements in place in 
different countries in relation to young people’s minimum wages and the school 
leaving age.  In general there is some variation in the age at which compulsory 
education ends – from as low as 14 in Portugal to 18 in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The age at which the full minimum wage is paid also varies – from 16 in 
Canada, Portugal, Spain and Finland, to age 25 (raised in 2010 from 15) in Greece.  
The state of the labour markets also varies widely, reflecting the different economic 
circumstances in each country. Youth unemployment ranges for those aged 15 to 24 
also vary from 11.6 per cent in Australia to 37.9 per cent in Spain and 36.5 per cent 
in the USA. In terms of participation rates in post-compulsory education, the 
proportion of 15 to 19 year olds in education ranges from over 90 per cent in Belgium 
and the Netherlands to just under 75 per cent in Australia. For 20 to 24 years olds, 
participation in education ranges from just 29.3 per cent in the UK to 52.1 per cent in 
the Netherlands. Tertiary education entry rates range from 30 per cent in Belgium to 
86 per cent in Australia. 
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TABLE 1a YOUTH LABOUR MARKETS AND MINIMUM WAGES: KEY FACTS BY COUNTRY 
 
*First time entrants as a percentage of the population of the corresponding age group. 
Source: (OECD 2010a). Labour market statistics: Labour force statistics by sex and age: indicators, OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics 
(database). (OECD 2010b). OECD Factbook 2010. (OECD 2010c) Education at a Glance 2010:OECD Indicators. Table C3.2a. 
 USA  Australia New 
Zealand 
Canada France Spain Belgium Netherlands  Portugal Greece UK Finland 
End of compulsory education 
age 
17 17 16 16 16 16 18 18 14 14.5 16 16 
Age full minimum wage 
usually applies 
20 21 18 16 18 16 21 23 16 25 21 16 
Youth Unemployment Rate  
in 2009 (age 15-24)  
(OECD 2010a) 
36.5% 11.6% 16.6% 15.3% 22.4% 37.9% 21.9% 7.3% 20.0% 25.8% 18.9% 16.4% 
Total Unemployment Rate in 
2009 (OECD 2010a) 
9.4% 5.7% 6.3% 8.4% 9.1% 18.1% 8.0% 3.9% 10.0% 9.6% 7.8% 8.3% 
Total Employment Rate in 
2009 (OECD 2010a) 
67.6% 72.0% 72.9% 71.5% 63.9% 60.6% 61.6% 75.8% 66.3% 61.2% 70.6% 64.8% 
Tertiary Education Entry 
rates in 2007 (OECD 
2010b)* 
65% 86% 76% - - 41% 30% 60% 64% 43% 55% 
 
47% 
15-19 year olds in education 
in 2008 (OECD 2010c) 
85.2% 79.5% 74.8% 80.4% 91.1% 78.9% 90.5% 90.7% 81.7% 86.8% 75.7% 87.2% 
20-24 year olds in education 
in 2008 (OECD 2010c) 
36.9% 40.5% 38.7% 38.9% 45.3% 34.0% 41.5% 52.1% 36.5% 48.5% 29.3% 38% 
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In Table 1b we show the key facts about the provision of minimum wages for young 
workers in each country.  As this table indicates, four countries provide the full 
minimum wage for all workers, irrespective of age (Canada, Spain, Portugal and 
Finland). In Greece the full minimum wage is now not payable until age 25. All the 
other countries have a youth sub-minimum rate and in several there is a scale of 
wage for age rates up the full adult rate (Australia, France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands).  In some cases, the relationship to the adult rate is a fixed proportion 
according to age (USA, Australia, New Zealand, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands).  Among our twelve countries, only in the UK is there no fixed 
relationship although in general the two lower rates have kept pace with the adult.  It 
is worth noting that, where a youth sub-minimum rate exists, the age at which the full 
rate becomes payable varies – from 23 in the Netherlands to 18 in France. 
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TABLE 1b: YOUTH MINIMUM WAGES 
 
Country Youth MWs as a percentage of adult MW rates Youth Rates 
USA 82.5% of full adult MW rate for youth at age 16-18. 
 
Lower minimum wage below age 20 in first 90 days in any job. FT 
students can be paid 85% of adult wage.  Student learners aged 
16 and over enrolled in vocational education can be paid 75% of 
adult rate 
Australia 50% for 16 year-olds; 60% for 17 year-olds; 75% for 18 year-olds; 
85% for 20 year-olds; adult wages apply at age 21.  
Typically a sliding scale applies from age 16 (40-50%) to age 20 
(85-100%). 
New Zealand 80% for 16-17 year-olds; full MW at age 18.      All employees entitled to adult minimum from age 16. New 
entrants and trainees can be paid 80% 
Canada 100%  Full minimum wage at all ages except in Ontario, which has 
retained youth rates.  
France 80% for 16 year-olds; 90% for 17 year-olds; full MW applies at age 18.   Certain categories of young person receive a reduced rate, 
provided they have worked less than six months in a sector. 
Spain 100% Full adult minimum from age 16. Those on training schemes for 
the unemployed can be paid 75%. 
Belgium 70% for 16 year-olds; 76% for 17 year-olds; 85% for 18 year-olds; 
94% for 19 year-olds; full MW applies at age 21.  
Reduced minimum wage by age (6% reduction per year). 
Netherlands 30% for 15 year-olds; 34.5% for 16 year-olds; 39.5% for 17 year-olds; 
45.5% for 18 year-olds; 52.5% for 19 year-olds; 61.5% for 20 year-
olds; 72.5% for 21 year-olds; 85% for 22 year-olds. 
Adult wage at age 23. Youth rates increase by age from age 15 to 
age 22. 
Portugal 100%  Full minimum wage at 16 but apprentices and trainees can be 
paid 80% of full rate. 
Greece 84% for those aged 15 to 24 Full minimum wage at age 25 (but varies depending on length of 
employment and marital status).  
UK 61.4% for 16-17 year-olds; 83% for 18-20 year-olds; Full MW at age 
21.  
No fixed proportion. Youth rates set separately on 
recommendations of Low Pay Commission for 16/17 year olds 
and those aged 18 to 20. Separate apprentice minimum rate of 
£2.50 from October 2010. 
Finland No statutory minimum wage; follows collective bargaining, normally at 
100% of adult rate.  
Finnish policy between 1993 and 1995 of allowing employers to 
pay workers under 25 below the agreed minimum rates, within the 
retail sector.   
Source: Low Pay Commission (2009) as amended 
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3.2 LIBERAL MARKET ECONOMIES 
 
a. USA 
 
In the USA minimum wages are determined at both Federal and State levels. Below 
we summarise Federal and State minimum wage laws. In addition, we also 
summarise Federal and State laws and standards that regulate the employment of 
young employees more widely. All data were drawn from the US Department of 
Labour (DOL) and were downloaded on or around 1 June, 2010. 
 
The Fair Minimum Wages Act of 2007 established a gradual increase in the Federal 
minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour in three successive increments. The 
final increment became effective on 24 July 2009 and now the majority of US States 
have minimum wage rates of $7.25 per hour.   The federal minimum wage provisions 
are contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Department of 
Labour’s Wage and Hour Division administers and enforces the federal minimum 
wage law.  
 
State Variations in the Minimum Wage: Many states also have minimum wage 
laws. In cases where an employee is subject to both the State and Federal minimum 
wage laws, the employee is entitled to the higher of the two minimum wages. Map 1, 
below, summarises the variations in State minimum wage standards relative to the 
Federal minimum wage. The State minimum wage rate requirements, or lack thereof, 
are controlled by legislative activities within the individual states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Map 1: Variations in State Minimum Wage Standards Relative to the Federal 
Minimum Wage 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
States with minimum wage rates 
higher than the Federal 
  
States with no minimum wage 
law (Federal minimum applies) 
 
States with minimum wage rates 
the same as the Federal 
  
States with minimum wage rates 
lower than the Federal (Federal 
minimum applies) 
 
American Samoa has special 
minimum wage arrangements 
  
 
Fourteen states have minimum wage rates that are higher than the Federal, ranging 
from Ohio ($7.30 per hour) to Washington ($8.55 per hour), 26 states have rates 
equal to the Federal level, five states have rates lower than the Federal level, 
ranging from Wyoming and Georgia ($5.15 per hour) to Colorado ($7.24 per hour), 
and five states - (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee) - 
have no state minimum wage laws. 
 
Young Workers and the Minimum Wage: The Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA) 
requires payment of at least the Federal Minimum Wage to be paid to non-exempt 
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employees.  A Federal Minimum Wage of $4.25 per hour applies to employees 
under the age of 20 during their first 90 consecutive calendar days of employment 
with an employer as long as their work does not displace other workers. After 90 
days, the Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay the full 
Federal minimum wage. Employers are not required to meet any training 
requirements in order to pay an eligible employee the youth wage. 
  
Both the FLSA and many states regulate the minimum age for employment during 
school and non-school hours, require employment or age certificates, and limit hours 
and days of work for young workers in agriculture. Under the FLSA the minimum age 
for agricultural employment is 16 during school hours. Outside school hours the 
minimum age is 14, or 12 with written parental consent, or on a farm where the 
parent is employed. The FLSA does not require employment or age certification. 
Agricultural employment is exempted from or is not listed among the covered sectors 
in the child labour laws of 17 states: Alabama, Delaware (non-hazardous 
employment), Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland (non-hazardous 
employment), Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska (covers only work in detasseling and 
beet fields), North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, West 
Virginia (non-hazardous employment) and Wyoming. Laws generally exclude minors 
employed by parents on family farms.  
 
Every state and territory requires children to enrol in public or private education or to 
be home-schooled. All children are required to continue their education into their 
high school years, with 26 states setting the cut off age at 16.  The remaining states 
require students to stay in school until age 17 or 18. Employment related provisions 
differ across States. States regulate the employment of young employees through 
compulsory school attendance laws that specify minimum and maximum ages for 
compulsory school attendance but many states prescribe various exemptions.  
 
 Literature 
Below, we assess the empirical evidence on the relationship between the minimum 
wage and labour market outcomes of young workers in the USA. The review is 
based on fourteen journal articles. Reaching a clear conclusion on the effect of the 
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minimum wage on youth is difficult because of differences in the data sets/sources 
used, methodology, the time frame and the way the minimum wage operates and 
interacts with other factors.  However, a careful reading of these contributions shows 
that in many cases the impact of the minimum wage on labour market outcomes for 
young workers might not be as strong as suggested by neo-classical theory and that 
other factors can play an important role. 
 
We develop our review of the literature in three sub-sections which deal in turn with 
the effects on employment, schooling and training.   
 
 Effect on young workers’ employment 
In this sub-section we focus on seven papers that deal with the issue of minimum 
wages and teenage employment, using either individual or state level data. Starting 
from the micro economic evidence, all but one of the papers reviewed analyse 
employment  together with enrolment decisions and displacement effects by 
formulating four specifications summarising four possible teenagers’ labour market 
outcomes: at school and not employed (SNE), at school and employed (SE) , not at 
school and employed (NSE) and not at school and not employed (NSNE)1. Neumark 
and Wascher (1995), using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the period 
1979-1992, show that the effect of the minimum wage on teen employment is quite 
small; however there is a clear indication that an increase in the minimum wage  
significantly increases the probability of a teenager becoming idle (NSNE) and 
leaving school. These results are generally supported by a more recent paper by the 
same authors (Neumark and Wascher 2003), using updated CPS data. In some of 
the specifications presented in the papers the authors show that the minimum wage 
has a positive effect on the proportion employed but not at school.   
 
Similar conclusions can be found in the analysis by Turner and Demiralp (2001). 
Here the authors  find that although the minimum wage has a negative effect on 
schooling, it has a positive effect on employment as workers in all categories 
considered in the analysis are more likely to become employed and less likely to 
                                               
1
 In this section we focus on the results related to employment, while enrolment decisions are 
discussed in the next section. 
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carry on studying following a minimum wage increase. This analysis is based on the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The authors claim that this 
source provides better information on teenage employment and enrolment decisions 
than the CPS. This study adds a further perspective to those offered in previous 
work by taking into account differences between individuals in terms of age, race, 
gender and whether they live in towns. Their results show that older teens (18-19 
years old), non-Hispanic and non-Black teens and females are more likely to leave 
school and find employment. Living in an urban area also means that teens are more 
likely to enter employment following a minimum wage hike.  Currie and Fallick (1996) 
use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth but only consider the 
dependent variable of employed or unemployed without explicitly considering 
education. Using a fixed effects approach to account for the unobserved constant 
differences between individuals, they find that those young people employed prior to 
the 1979 and 1980 federal minimum wages were around 3 per cent less likely to be 
employed a year afterwards.   
 
Turning to the evidence based on national time series data, all the papers reviewed 
in this sub-section address the issue of the weak relationship between minimum 
wages and employment. This subject was initially discussed in Brown, Gilroy and 
Kohen (1982) and later in Card and Krueger (1995). In these papers the authors 
noticed that up to 1979 estimates of the impact of the minimum wage on teenage 
employment revealed a negative impact; however, when using a longer time 
dimension covering the 1980s, the minimum wage coefficient lost statistical 
significance, suggesting a decline in the effect of the minimum wage over time. 
However, these initial estimates were highly unstable because they were plagued by 
serial correlation problems and specification issues.2 Park and Ratti (1998) address 
these problems by first analysing the properties of the data included in a typical time 
series model. The authors observe that the dependent variable (the ratio of civilian 
employment to civilian population for teenagers) is stationary but most of the 
explanatory variables are I (1), i.e. they are stationary only in first differences. This 
means that results based on the equations specified in levels will generate spurious 
results. The authors than compare the results based on non-stationary data and on 
                                               
2
 A clear discussion of this problem can be found in William and Mills (2001).  
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stationary data3. While the former suggest a negative and significant impact of the 
minimum wage on teens’ employment, the latter show that such effect is not 
statistically significant, thus substantially changing the importance of the relationship. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of seasonal effects4 and ARCH 
(autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) effects.  
 
The issue of stationarity is further discussed in Williams and Mills (2001) where, 
starting from a replication of the results in Card and Krueger (1995), the authors 
show that by using a more sophisticated dynamic specification one can achieve a 
better understanding of the relationship between a minimum wage and teenage 
employment. William and Mills’ criticism of the earlier analysis rests on two main 
arguments: firstly that the OLS estimator, as underlined above, will produce spurious 
results in the presence of variables that are non-stationary and non-co integrated. 
Secondly, that the minimum wage variable is likely to be endogenous and that this 
creates a problem of biased and inconsistent estimates.  To support their claim, the 
authors compare results based on simple OLS and results based on more dynamic 
model specifications. The OLS estimates reveal the same pattern of results 
discussed in Card and Krueger (1995), i.e. the significance of the impact of the MW 
on teen employment decreases and becomes statistically insignificant when 
considering longer time periods. Tests for stationarity confirm the results in Park and 
Ratti (1998), providing further confirmation of the spurious regression problem.  
The use of a dynamic labour demand model, including lagged values of the 
dependent and the independent variable, allows Williams and Mills to address the 
non-stationarity problem and to account for other factors that might affect the 
relationship between minimum wage and teenage employment, such as adjustment 
costs and employers’ expectations about future minimum wage increases. To 
address the endogeneity issues the authors use system estimation (VAR –Vector 
Autoregression Analysis). Their results show that the minimum wage explains 
between 3 per cent and 12 per cent of the total variation in teenage employment. A 
simulation exercise shows that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage initially 
                                               
3
 Non-stationarity is eliminated by taking first differences of the series. 
4
 Park and Ratti (1998) note that seasonality has always played an important role in evaluating the 
time series evidence of teenagers’ employment. 
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causes a decline in teenage employment, which reaches the maximum value after 
two years (approximately 4.5 per cent). However, the effect disappears after four 
years.  
 
Bazen and Marimoutou (2002) extend the time series evidence by focusing on the 
stochastic nature of the seasonal, cyclical and trend components in teenage 
employment.  A previous contribution by Solon (1985) had already demonstrated 
that treating these components as deterministic is not appropriate, while Koopman et 
al (1995) claimed that a correction for the presence of first order residual 
autocorrelation imposes a very restrictive dynamic model which is unable to capture 
the relationship between minimum wage and teenage employment. Bazen and 
Marimotou (2002) re-estimate the earlier model and show that their predictive power 
is quite strong until the late 70s, while failing to account for the changes in teenage 
employment for the period 1980-1993. The authors argue that, when analysing a 
longer time period, dynamic models need to allow for more flexibility in the various 
components using a structural time series model.  Their results show that increases 
in the real minimum wage have a negative impact on teenage employment. Within 
the same quarter, if the real minimum wage increases by 1 per cent, teenage 
employment will decrease by 0.1 per cent. In the long term it will decrease teenage 
employment by 0.2 per cent. Overall this model suggests that the effect of the 
minimum wage is significant but rather smaller. Moreover, the authors show that the 
impact is even smaller if average wages increase, given that the results show a 
positive relationship between average wages and teenage employment in the long 
run. 
 
 Impact upon participation in education 
Another aspect of particular concern is whether an increase in the minimum wage 
and, in the case of the UK, increasing coverage to include teenagers, can have a 
negative impact on schooling decisions and, by extension, on future skill 
development and job opportunities. This aspect is particularly difficult to assess 
because teen workers are more mobile and their employment and/or schooling 
decisions are likely to change in a fairly short period of time. There are also other 
factors that might affect their choices and the outcome of these choices, for example 
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the economic cycle or family background.  Most of the papers reviewed introduce 
controls for these factors in an attempt to disentangle their impact on youth 
employment from the effect of the minimum wage.  
 
We start our discussion by examining two earlier contributions by Neumark and 
Wascher, both published in 1995. The first paper (Neumark and Wascher 1995a), 
based on state level data for the period 1977-1989, shows that the minimum wage 
has a negative impact on enrolment and a positive impact on the number of workers 
not enrolled and not in employment. Additionally the authors find evidence that the 
minimum wage increases the employment of more skilled workers and decreases 
the employment of those with lower skills (the disemployment effect). In a parallel 
work, Neumark and Wascher (1995b) further address the relationship between 
minimum wages and education using individual data derived from matched Current 
Population Surveys (CPS) for 1979-1992. They analyse the enrolment decision 
together with the displacement effect as the two phenomena are assumed to be 
related under the main hypothesis. As discussed in the next part of this section, all 
teenagers are divided into four groups according to their education enrolment 
status5. At first sight their results seem to support the authors’ main hypothesis, i.e. 
that a higher minimum wage increases the demand for higher educated teenagers to 
reduce their schooling, while at the same time driving the lower skilled out of their 
job. In fact, the estimates reveal that increases in the minimum wage positively affect 
the probability of becoming idle (NSNE) and reduce the probability of being at school 
and employed (SE). Looking at transitions across the four categories considered in 
two consecutive years, the authors find that teenagers in all categories in year one 
are less likely to be in SE in year two and more likely to be in the NSNE group. 
  
A closer look at the results reveals that the effect of minimum wages is particularly 
large for the 18-19 year olds, compared to the 16-17 year olds. In fact, for the 18-19 
year olds the authors find a large, positive and significant effect on the probability of 
moving from SE to NSE. Their interpretation is that more skilled workers (the more 
educated employees) are displacing less skilled workers (the younger employees). 
                                               
5
 These groups are: at school and employed (SE), not at school and employed (NSE), at school and 
not employed (SNE), not at school and not employed (NSNE). 
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However, the distinction between the two age groups also suggests that workers that 
reach the school leaving age are more likely to leave school. This is quite a 
predictable outcome. It is possible that the school leaving age is having an impact 
here, as we discuss below. 
 
Some US studies find a negative relationship between the minimum wage and 
school enrolment (Neumark and Wascher 1995, Turner and Demiralp 2001) but 
these do not directly address the relationship. Turner and Demiralp (2001) use the 
same methodology as Neumark and Wascher (1995b) but a different data set, the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The main advantage of this 
survey is that it attempts to follow teens moving out of their parents’ household. A 
number of youths aged 16 to 19 were interviewed first in 1991 and then again the 
following year. The paper particularly refers to the proposed increase in the federal 
MW from $5.15 to $6.15 per hour and attempts at evaluating the possible outcomes. 
Similarly to Neumark and Wascher, the authors find that an increase in the minimum 
wage reduces the probability of enrolment. However, and contrary to previous 
evidence, an increase in the minimum wage reduces the probability of becoming 
idle, i.e. not at school and not employed. The analysis also accounts for differences 
in the 16-17 and 18-19 age groups and supports the evidence that the 18-19 years 
old are more likely to leave school and become employed compared to those aged 
16-17 years. Therefore this study confirms the negative impact of the minimum wage 
on schooling but, contradicting the conclusions of Neumark and Wascher, also 
provides evidence that the minimum wage reduces the number of idle teenagers.  
 
Looking more closely at the schooling effect, Chaplin et al (2003) analyse the impact 
of the minimum wage on school enrolment while controlling for the ethnic 
background, urban status and different compulsory schooling laws in different US 
states. Their analysis is based on data on high school enrolment from the Common 
Core of Data, collected by the US Department of Education.  The number of 
observations is not as large as other data sources such as the CPS but the authors 
claim that this data source provides more accurate information on enrolment. Their 
results show that the minimum wage does not significantly affect enrolment rates. 
However, when the minimum wage interacts with different actual school leaving 
ages, the interaction variable has a significant impact in those states where the 
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school leaving age is 16 or less. Yet, independent of the minimum wage, the 
continuation ratio is lower in states where students are allowed to leave school at 
age 16 or less. This effect is stronger than the effect induced by the minimum wage. 
There are no statistically significant effects when the actual leaving age is above 16 
years old. Thus it appears that the main factors affecting schooling decisions are 
linked with the compulsory schooling laws rather than the minimum wage legislation. 
The authors themselves suggest this conclusion and also discuss possible policies 
to adopt in states where the legal school leaving age is 16 or less, such as the 
requirement of parental permission to enter the labour market. The study shows that 
the minimum wage has an effect only in those states where teenagers are allowed to 
leave school early by law. In states where the dropout age is above 16 years old 
there is no minimum wage effect. The policy implication is to either increase the legal 
school leaving age or adopt measures that require some form of parental consent for 
very young workers to leave school and enter the labour market. 
  
Neumark and Wascher (2003) provide additional evidence on the relationship 
between schooling and the minimum wage. They also address a series of criticisms 
presented by Evans and Turner (1995) related to the use of the correct definition of 
school enrolment6. The analysis is based on a simple regression of enrolment rates 
for the 16-19 year olds on the minimum wage variable and other covariates such as 
the unemployment rate and a dummy variable for a compulsory schooling age. The 
analysis shows that the minimum wage has a significant and negative effect on 
enrolment rates. The first set of results looks at the effect of the minimum wage on 4 
enrolment/employment categories for 16-19 year olds, an approach similar to that of 
their previous analysis. A particularly robust result is the positive and significant 
effect of the minimum wage on the proportion of teenagers neither in school nor 
employed (idle) in the period 1980-1989: ‘...regardless of the month, enrolment 
measure or covariance matrix used in the model, as long as the data are measured 
in a time consistent manner’. In fact, the result disappears only when there are 
inconsistencies in the data, discussed at length in the paper. The presence of such 
                                               
6
 Specifically Evans and Turner (1995) claim that the definition of school enrolment in Neumark and 
Wascher (1995) is too narrow because it does not include individuals attending school on a part time 
basis.  
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inconsistencies is the main criticism of the results in Evans and Turner (1995).  
Neumark and Wascher also use an extended sample (1980-1998), and note that the 
size of the impact of the minimum wage on the proportion of idle teenagers is much 
smaller than in the 1980-1989 sample period (0.18 compared to 0.64).  Additionally, 
the authors find the minimum wage to have a positive and significant impact on the 
proportion of workers employed but not enrolled.  A second set of results 
concentrates on a simple regression of enrolment rates for 16-19 year olds on the 
minimum wage variable and other covariates such as the unemployment rate and a 
dummy variable for compulsory schooling age. The analysis shows that the minimum 
wage has a significant and negative effect on enrolment rates, particularly when 
relaxing the assumption of serially independent and homoscedastic errors. 
Interestingly, this effect becomes insignificant in states where the compulsory 
schooling age is 18, while it is stronger in states where the compulsory schooling 
age is less than 18. This result is consistent with Chaplin et al (2003).  
 
A consistent result observed in Newmark and Wascher (1995b) is the increase in the 
probability that teenagers become idle after an increase in the minimum wage. The 
authors claim that following a minimum wage increase individuals start queuing up 
for jobs. This is certainly a possibility; however, alternative explanations could also 
be valid: for example individuals may be queuing up because they do not 
immediately find a job or they might not find the job they want. 
 
Neumark and Wascher (2001) widen the analysis of the relationship between 
schooling and the minimum wage by looking at the training obtained to qualify for 
workers’ current jobs. This includes training carried out within the schooling system 
as well as additional training courses (such as formal company training programme 
or informal on-the-job training.). The analysis uses CPS data for 1983 and for 1991 
and it classifies workers into three age groups: 16-24, 16-19, 20-24. This cross 
sectional analysis for the year 1991 introduces a time dimension via the construction 
of the minimum wage variable (the percentage by which the state minimum 
exceeded the federal minimum over the previous 3 years) and in the use of a control 
group for the year 1983. The descriptive analysis is very detailed and shows 
interesting differences among the different age groups. The descriptive analysis 
shows that a higher proportion of 16-19 year olds are paid the minimum wage and 
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that the highest incidence of training is among the 20-24 age group.  The authors 
suggest this produces evidence that those aged 20-24 are likely to be more affected 
by the minimum wage than those 16-19.  Because of high turnover, teenagers may 
be in jobs that require little if any training.  
 
The study reveals some inconsistencies between the descriptive statistics and 
empirical analysis. For example, the descriptive analysis shows that the proportion of 
workers undertaking training to qualify for their present job is higher in states with 
higher minimum wages. However, the econometric analysis does not find any 
significant effects of this phenomenon, the only exception being a positive and 
significant effect of the minimum wage on school training for the 16-19 age group. 
For the 20-24 year olds there is a negative minimum wage effect. Overall, very few 
coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
The analysis is very rigorous but the results are not always convincing. The authors 
present two sets of results, with and without demographic variables. In many 
instances the size and the significance of the coefficient estimates drop when 
accounting for these demographic factors. Because no information is provided on the 
econometric performance of these additional variables it is impossible to assess 
whether they should be included or not. Similar to the study by Chaplin et al (2003) 
all specifications include an interaction term between the MW and the age of the 
individual, but the minimum wage is not included as an explanatory variable on its 
own. Again, this might affect the results.   
 
 Minimum wages and on-the-job training 
The third aspect analysed concerns the possible impact of the minimum wage on 
training undertaken while working. The earlier evidence on the relationship between 
minimum wages and on-the-job training is rather mixed. Hashimoto (1982) and 
Leighton and Mincer (1981) claim that a binding minimum wage will reduce training. 
On the other hand, Card and Krueger (1995) do not find any significant minimum 
wage effect in the fast food industry in Texas. A more recent and frequently cited 
work is Grossberg and Sicilian (1999). This contribution does not focus on young 
workers but it provides a starting point for reviewing the more recent evidence as it 
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has provoked further related study. A peculiarity of this work, compared to most of 
the existing studies, is the use of firm level rather than individual data. The data are 
derived from the Employment Opportunities Pilot Project (EOPP) and include 3000 
firms. This is a cross sectional analysis for the year 1982. The information mainly 
relates to the South and Midwest and predominantly consists of small and low-wage 
employers, so care must be used in generalising from the results. The authors 
estimate a training intensity equation for men and women under assumptions of 
different effects for the two groups of workers. Their results show that the coefficient 
on the minimum wage variables for male workers is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that male workers who start at the minimum wage have a lower 
probability of being trained. However, further tests show that there is no significant 
difference between the quantity of on-the-job training received by workers in 
minimum wage jobs and the amount of training received by workers in other low-
paying jobs. These findings indicate that as far as training is concerned the type of 
job matters more than the minimum wage status. This confirms existing descriptive 
analysis showing that minimum wage workers are likely to be employed in sectors 
that requires less training. For women starting at the minimum wage the coefficients 
are positive but not statistically significant, indicating that they do not experience 
lower training than their male counterparts. 
 
An early reaction to this set of results came from Neumark and Wascher (2001), who 
aim to re-assess the relationship between the minimum wage and training using 
employee data and, in particular, to address some specification issues in Grossberg 
and Sicilian (1999). The econometric analysis is carried out for all young workers 
(16-24 years) and for two subgroups: 16-19 year olds and 20-24 year old workers. 
Accounting for the two age groups reveals interesting results that are particularly 
relevant for UK policy. In fact the evidence shows that the minimum wage reduces 
the incidence of on-the-job training among 16-24 and 20-24 year olds. The estimated 
effect is significant at the 10 per cent level. However, for teenage workers the effect 
is negative but not statistically significant. As discussed above, these results are 
sensitive to the introduction of demographic variables. When considering individual 
characteristics the only result which is robust across different specifications is the 
negative impact of the minimum wage on the formal training of 20-24 year olds. The 
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results show that the minimum wage has no effect on the training of the youngest 
group of workers.  
 
The type of data used in Neumark and Wascher (2001) is criticised by Fairris and 
Pedace (2004). They claim that an analysis of the impact of the minimum wage on 
training should be undertaken using establishment level data because ultimately the 
firms pay for the training and not the worker. Similarly to Grossberg and Sicilian 
(1999), Fairris and Pedace (2004) analyse the impact of the minimum wage on on-
the-job training using an Employer Survey (NES) and the study does not focus on 
young workers. The paper aims at addressing the issue of poor measurement of on 
–the-job-training as well as controlling for establishment-level characteristics that can 
affect training. The sample size is fairly large (a cross section of 1098 observations) 
and the NES provides detailed information about hours of training and percentage of 
workers training. These are better measures than the commonly used dichotomous 
variable (training/no training) so the data are particularly fit for their purpose. The 
authors do not find any significant impact of the minimum wage on the average 
hours of training per worker. This result is very strong and consistent across all 
specifications presented in the paper. The evaluation of the impact of the minimum 
wage on the percentage of workers receiving training is rather more problematic as 
results change across different estimation techniques and different measures of the 
minimum wage. The analysis is carried out in a very rigorous way and the authors 
openly discuss the shortcomings of each of their specifications. They themselves 
conclude that the evidence of the effect of minimum wages on the percentage of 
workers receiving training is mixed and particularly weak. 
 
An in-depth analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and on the-job-
training is presented in Acemoglu and Pischke (2003). The contribution is particularly 
interesting because the authors present a detailed theoretical model showing that 
deviations from perfectly competitive markets, which introduce firm-specific rents and 
prevent workers from financing their own training, change the conclusions of 
Becker’s theory, which means that the minimum wage can increase investments in 
general training. The empirical analysis uses the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY). This is a panel of youths which oversamples those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. It contains a relatively high number of low wage 
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workers directly affected by minimum wage increases. However, the sample period 
used excludes very young workers. The NLSY is a panel of youths aged 14 to 21 in 
1979 but the analyses follow the cohorts from 1987-1992 (so the workers will be 22-
27 years old). The authors estimate two specifications: a specification in first 
differences, which is a new methodological contribution, and a specification in levels, 
which allows comparisons with previous studies. With regard to first differences the 
authors find no significant effect of minimum wages on training, using different 
control groups. The results also show that workers starting a new job are more likely 
to receive training. This effect is highly significant (but unrelated to the minimum 
wage).  
 
In the estimation in levels most of the results show no or little effect of the minimum 
wage on training even when considering several factors that might affect the results 
(sample characteristics, measurement errors, training measure used). This 
contradicts previous evidence presented in Neumark and Wascher (1998) and 
Leighton and Mincer (1981). The introduction of region, time and the individual as 
factors is what mainly renders the coefficients non significant, but the authors claim 
that these effects must be accounted for.  
 
Schiller (1994) analyses the impact of minimum wages on training and wage gains of 
workers aged 15-23, using the NLSY. The age of the workers ranges between 14-22 
at the beginning of the sample and 22-30 at its end. The survey is particularly 
suitable for conducting this type of analysis as it contains specific questions on 
training. The authors estimate two equations: a training equation (using a logit 
model) and a wage growth equation (using OLS). The analysis is based on a large 
sample of workers followed over the years 1979-1987.  A simple analysis of the data 
reveals that over 85 per cent of the minimum wage entrants state that they liked their 
jobs and over 60 per cent felt that they were learning skills that would be valuable in 
attaining better jobs. Over half of the minimum wage workers perceived opportunities 
for promotion with the same employer. However, the logit analysis reveals that 
minimum wage status does reduce training. The descriptive analysis also reveals 
that few minimum wage entrants stay in minimum wage jobs for over three years. 
The analysis concludes that a large majority of young workers do not feel trapped in 
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low wages jobs with low training opportunities but feel that they are gaining valuable 
experience, and that they have chances for promotion. 
 
 Conclusion 
We examined three key areas and summarise the results for each in turn below. 
 
Minimum wages and employment: there is some evidence of the former having a 
positive effect on the latter. When the effect is negative, it is small and in most cases 
it tends to disappear in the long run (the only exception is Bazen and Marimoutou 
2002). 
 
Effect of minimum wage on schooling: there is little effect in states where teenagers 
are allowed to leave school at age 18. The school leaving age is more relevant than 
the minimum wage. 
 
Effect on training: here there are very mixed results. There is possibly a prevalence 
of negative effects but these are not always statistically significant. It is important to 
note that individuals entering at the minimum wage do not perceive themselves to be 
in a disadvantaged situation; rather they believe they are gaining important 
experience.  
 
b. Canada 
 
Canada has a comparatively long history of legislative intervention in wage setting 
with – albeit piecemeal province-level - regulation of minimum wages dating from 
1918 (Thomson & Taras, 2004). The current framework of a Federal directive laying 
down the principle of a minimum wage with Provincial/Territorial discretion for the 
setting of rates dates from 1960. It should be noted that rates across Canada have 
historically been tiered according to various criteria including the distinction between 
urban and rural workers and, more controversially, men and women workers 
(abolished in the 1970s). Although gender and intra-province differentials have been 
formally abolished, the framework is still substantially tiered with distinctions 
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prescribed for, among other things, piece-rates for picking different types of fruit in 
the agricultural domain and, more pertinently, between ‘youth’ and adult workers. 
 
Across the Provincial/Territorial jurisdictions, rates vary by approximately $2 
Canadian per hour, with minimum rates calculated on the basis of the retail price 
index as prescribed federally. In some Provinces/Territories, there have been 
numerous exemptions to the published ‘adult’ rate for young (‘student’, ‘entry-level’, 
‘youth’) workers and those in particular industries (e.g. liquor, where gratuities are 
customary). Currently only Ontario has a lower youth rate.  
 
The minimum wage agenda has created certain policy problems for the authorities, 
particularly where unemployment/underemployment among school leavers has been 
a problem (see Campolieti et al, 2005). Conversely, some policy makers see 
problems with minimum wages disincentivising staying on at school post-16. 
However, policy makers have also seen the need to mitigate poverty and social 
exclusion resulting from low wages. 
 
From the articles examined, only the employment effects and impact upon 
participation in education were covered. No papers were found covering the effect of 
the minimum wage upon the training of young people.  
 
Compulsory education ends at age 16 in Canada but over 80 per cent of those aged 
15 to 19 are in education. Youth unemployment is relatively low at 15.3 per cent, but 
higher than the total unemployment rate of 8.4 per cent.  
 
 Impact on employment 
Canada is geographically proximate to the USA and although substantial historical, 
cultural and institutional differences are evident between the two employee relations 
systems, the scholars who approach the analysis of labour issues therein tend to 
factor in a priori that there is isomorphism between them. Commentators have 
highlighted the problems of using econometric models developed in the US in a 
Canadian context (see Campolieti et al, 2005a, 2005b, and 2006; Landon, 1997).  
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Although literature on the impact of the minimum wage on youth employment and 
related issues in Canada is not extensive, what exists tends to be based in an 
institutional economics frame of reference using panel data from Canadian Labour 
Force Surveys (Baker et al, 1999; Campolieti et al, 2005a, 2005b and 2006; 
Edagbami, 2006; McDonald and Myatt, 2004; Swidinsky, 1980; Yuen, 2003). They 
then seek to draw conclusions relating to the impact on unemployment levels and 
real wage levels. These studies generally find a negative effect of minimum wages 
upon the employment of young workers.    
 
Few studies undertake any investigation of education or skill formation, Landon 
(1997) being a notable exception, although the age of this study perhaps 
compromises its impact.  
 
Swidinsky (1980) can be seen as the ‘classic’ study of the relationship between 
minimum wage interventions and youth employment and is frequently cited, although 
its age might be seen as a limitation. In common with subsequent studies, he 
appears to have established a relationship (positive) between the intervention and 
levels of youth unemployment, suggesting that interventions are, in principle, harmful 
to employment prospects. 
 
Subsequent studies have sought to build on his analysis and correct apparent 
methodological limitations. However, despite attempts at meta-analysis and critique, 
the majority of studies appear to be locked into this frame of reference (see 
Edagbemi, 2006).  
 
 Impact on participation in education 
Landon (1997) found a negative effect of minimum wages upon participation in 
education with the larger the minimum wage increase the larger effect on drop-out 
rates. The findings of this paper are somewhat controversial as they appear to refute 
both the human capital and social democratic policy orthodoxies which maintain that 
increased resourcing of education will result in higher educational participation and 
attainment (a position which previous economic analyses have taken, also refuted by 
the author on methodological grounds). Landon suggests (with certain caveats) that 
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the level of the minimum wage in each province is a greater determining factor on 
whether youths drop out of high-school or not.  
 
Landon (1997) explains that this is due to the opportunity costs of education being 
increased as employment seems like a more attractive option. Also, with a higher 
minimum wage, employers are more likely to seek to invest in higher value full-time 
workers than part-time, hence high school students are incentivised to drop-out. The 
author emphasises that socio-economic and geographical variables are significant in 
these patterns, however. Also, there are variations between 16 and 17 year olds and 
between males and females (males being more likely to drop out). Ultimately, the 
message is: if policy makers want youths to stay on at high school in order to 
increase the chances of higher educational attainment, they should take the level of 
the youth minimum wage into account in their interventions.  
 
Campolieti et al (2005a), however, found no net effect on school enrolment or on the 
individual transition probabilities and no significant substitution of students for non-
students leaving school to queue for the higher minimum wage.  
 
 Conclusion 
From the limited literature, if any lessons were to be learned, they would probably 
relate to how policy impacts those industries that rely on a young, flexible workforce. 
The UK retail and hospitality sectors rely on a flexible youth labour force, many of 
whom will be simultaneously in post-16 education. It is possible that, should the 
relative level of the minimum wage be altered, there could be a negative impact on 
educational participation and achievement. 
 
c. Australia 
 
Minimum wage regulation in Australia is both long-standing, extending back to the 
end of the nineteenth century, and complex – involving provisions set at both state- 
and national-level within the Australian federal system. Australia first adopted a 
minimum wage system in 1907, following the ‘Harvester case’, in which the presiding 
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judge of the Court was required to establish ‘fair and reasonable wages’.7 ‘Margins’ 
were subsequently added to this on the basis of skill, using benchmarks derived from 
the metalworking industries.  The situation regarding minimum wages in Australia 
has been in flux in recent years. In 2010 a set of minimum national employment 
standards, including a national minimum wage, were established. These have 
displaced state-level provisions. Additional complication is added by the fact that in 
the past some states were in the federal jurisdiction and some were not.  
 
From 1997 the Australian Industrial Relations Commission set a ‘safety net’ of wage 
increases for workers who had not secured increases through enterprise bargaining 
(Cowling and Mitchell, 2007), which co-existed with federal and state minimum 
wages (some of them below the federal level). The Workplace Relations Amendment 
Act 2005, known as ‘Work Choices’, exempted small firms from employment 
protection legislation and restricted trade union rights. The Act also established the 
Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC), which replaced the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission. The role of the AFPC was to set and adjust a single adult 
national minimum wage, non-adult minimum wages (such as training wage), 
minimum wages for award classification levels and casual loadings. According to 
Cowling and Mitchell (2007), this step was motivated by the view held by the national 
government that safety net  increases had been ‘inimical to the goal of generating 
additional jobs, apprenticeships and traineeships, and that such adjustments should 
be confined to the lower paid’. The policy was supported by claims ‘of the negative 
effects on employment arising from the operation of the current Workplace Relations 
Act’ (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, cited in Cowling and 
Mitchell, 2007), although no estimates were provided by the DEWR.  
 
The Fair Work Act 2009 was introduced by the Labour Government in a step 
intended to reverse much of the change introduced in 1996 and 2005/6. However, 
there has been no reversal of centralisation, and the enacted measures listed below 
mean that virtually the entire private sector workforce is now covered by minimum 
standards set federally. The Act established Fair Work Australia (FWA) as a new 
government industrial relations institution which began operations on 1 July 2009. 
                                               
7
 Wage boards had been established in some states in the latter years of the nineteenth century. 
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Under the provisions of the Act a national system of ten employment standards was 
established, providing a floor of minimum conditions. There are therefore a number 
of instruments that regulate minimum pay (defined as the base rate of pay for 
ordinary hours worked). The situation is still in flux from the preceding arrangements, 
and some issues are regulated by transitional provisions. 
 
From1 January 2010, modern awards replaced most existing awards and set 
minimum terms and conditions for employees in particular industries and 
occupations. While modern awards mostly prescribe minimum wages, there were 
transitional arrangements in place, under which the wage-related components did 
not come into effect until 1July 2010, and may be phased in over five years. 
 
Minimum wages under modern awards may include: wage rates for adults, in some 
cases, on a scale reflecting experience and qualifications; wage rates for juniors, 
employees with a disability, and employees undergoing training; ‘casual loadings’ 
(additional pay for casual employees, see also below); piece rates. An employee 
may not be paid less than the rate of pay applicable to them under a modern award. 
 
Employees not covered by an award or enterprise agreement are guaranteed the 
Federal (National) Minimum Wage. Under the Fair Work Act (2009) the provisions 
regulating the minimum wage were amended, with a new statement of the aim of the 
minimum wage and the role of the new Fair Work Commission in setting and 
adjusting the rates, conducting appropriate consultations with interested parties and 
commissioning research. 
 
Under the Fair Work Act of 2009, Fair Work Australia must ‘establish and maintain a 
safety net of fair minimum wages’, taking into account: national economic 
performance, promotion of workforce participation, needs of the low paid and relative 
living standards, equal pay, fair minima for young workers, trainees and those with a 
disability.  Fair Work Australia took over this responsibility from the Australian Fair 
Pay Commission (AFPC) in 2010. The AFPC was abolished in December 2009. The 
first review by Fair Work Australia by the new Minimum Wage Panel took place 
between March and June 2010. 
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The national minimum wage does not apply to ‘junior employees’ (i.e. an employee 
aged under-21); employees in a ‘training arrangement’ (i.e. trainees and 
apprenticeships) and employees with a disability. Employees in the first of these two 
categories (young people and trainees and apprentices) will not have a national 
minimum wage set for them under the new arrangements until the 2011 review, with 
a requirement to set a national minimum wage for award/agreement free junior 
employees as from 1 July 2011. This has left them temporarily without a national 
minimum wage.  However, these employees may be covered by state minimum 
wages, which provide for deductions from the adult rate for employees not covered 
by an award or agreement for employees still within state employment systems, as 
well as under the modern award system at individual industry level. Awards typically 
include special rates for young workers. 
 
The minimum wage in 2008 was equivalent to 45 per cent of mean earnings, and 52 
per cent of median earnings. Both figures indicate a decline in the relative value of 
the minimum wage in recent years (OECD, 2010). 
 
School education in Australia is compulsory between certain ages. Depending on the 
state or territory, school is compulsory from the age of five or six to the age of 17 
(school leaving ages were raised in most states between 2005-9, most recently in 
2009 from 15 to 17 in Northern Territories). According to the OECD, until recently 
more Australians left school at 16 than in most other OECD countries, with the 
incentives for staying-on diminished by the attractions of employment during a long 
economic upswing.8 Despite this, the system is seen as not being characterised by a 
‘long-tail of underachievers’ and as contributing to high social intergenerational 
mobility.9 However, there are concerns about upper-secondary achievement, and 
this has been addressed in part through raising the school leaving age in most states 
to 17. There is also a programme of trade training centres in schools.  
 
Youth unemployment in Australia is relatively low at 11.6 per cent but higher than the 
total unemployment rate of 5.7 per cent. Almost 80 per cent of those aged 15 to 19 
                                               
8
 OECD (2009) Jobs for Youth: Australia, Paris: OECD. 
9
 Koutsogeorgopoulou, V. (2009) ‘Enhancing educational performance in Australia’ OECD Working 
Paper, No. 678. 
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are in education, following increases in the school-leaving age. These and other 
changes in the past two decades have cut the proportion of the adult population (25-
64) with below upper secondary education from 47 per cent in 1997 to 30 per cent by 
2008, with 82 per cent of the 25-34 age group now having at least this level10.  
 
 Literature 
There is limited econometric research on the impact of minimum wages in Australia, 
and only one study specifically concerned with its impact on young people has been 
located (Mangan and Johnston, 1999). This resorting to estimates derived from 
outside Australia was also noted by Leigh (2003 - see footnote below).11 In his own 
study, Leigh (2003) takes advantage of the scope for a ‘natural experiment’ by using 
changes in the state minimum wage rate in Western Australia and comparing this 
with the rest of Australia.  Until 2006, state minima were in force and the studies 
looked at below are based on state minimum wages.  No literature was found 
concerning participation in education or the effects on training for young workers. 
 
The studies considered are: Mangan and Johnston (1999) on youth minimum wages 
and employment, Leigh (2003) on minimum wages and employment (including a 
commentary by Watson (2004) and an Erratum by Leigh (2004) and Junankar et al 
(2000), which is essentially a sceptical paper on the validity of estimations of wage 
elasticities. 
 
Mangan and Johnston (1999) found a small and negative impact of declining 
differentials between youth rates and adult rates on employment. For Queensland, 
the partial elasticity for full-time (f/t) employment was -0.27 (15-19 year-olds) and -
0.28 (15-17 year-olds). For part-time employment the only statistically significant 
result was - 0.07 for 15-17 year-olds. For Australia, the elasticity for full-time 
employment was -0.17 (15-19 year-olds) and -0.05 (15-17 year-olds). For p/t 
employment the only statistically significant result was -0.21 for 15-17 year-olds. 
                                               
10
 OECD (2010) Education at a Glance 
11
 Leigh notes ‘…debate in Australia has focused around empirical estimates from other countries’ 
(ibid. 361). The bulk of these studies look at debates in the USA and the UK; Junankar (2000) notes 
the OECD 1998 Employment Outlook review. 
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There was some evidence for higher supply of labour as minimum wages rose. 
However, no statistically significant results were found running one of the standard 
regressions (Mincer, 1976). Mangan and Johnston (1999) suggest that wage 
differentials between young people and adults can have a positive impact on 
employment, but the effect is very small and wage differentials are unlikely, 
therefore, to have a major impact in determining youth employment and enrolment. 
However, the effect could be sufficient to ‘sustain those youth jobs that are currently 
dependent on the adult/youth wage differential’ (Mangan and Johnston, 1999). An 
effect perceived to be more important was the introduction of a compulsory training 
element through a training wage, the expected widening of differentials between 
adults and young people, and the shifting of some of the burden to the individual and 
government, in consequence of which employers would be more likely to hire on 
such contracts.12 
 
Leigh (2003) found small negative elasticity of employment using a difference-in-
differences approach, comparing changes in employment in Western Australia with 
changes in the rest of Australia when there were differences in minimum wages 
between the two. For all age-groups the elasticity was -0.29. Young workers seemed 
to be more affected than other groups (-0.39). This study attracted a particularly 
pointed rejoinder (Watson, 2004) disputing the feasibility of the ‘quasi-experiment’ 
involved as the basis for a difference-in-differences approach, and also questioning 
the regressions. The first elasticity quoted is based on an erratum issued by Leigh 
(2004), but the figure for young people was derived from the initial study, which was 
not re-run. 
 
Junankar et al (2000) ran a series of estimations, but concluded that ‘only in a very 
few cases were wage elasticities negative and significant’. In most cases, the 
estimated elasticities ‘are almost always incorrectly signed or statistically 
insignificant’. The elasticities they did derive that were appropriate signed and 
significant were in line with much of the international literature (-2.05 to -3.1). 
                                               
12
 A training wage was introduced under a National Award (National Training Wage Award, 2000) and 
applies to approved training; there are separate provisions for apprenticeship schemes. 
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However, these applied to only very specific demographic groups.13 There was no 
theoretical model to suggest why specifically only these groups from a much larger 
sample of employees generated elasticities. The intention of the paper is to cast 
doubt on the exercise in principle. 
 
 Conclusion 
The three Australian empirical studies that aimed to establish elasticity of 
employment in respect of the minimum wage showed a small negative elasticity in 
line with other international work. However, one of these studies (Leigh, 2003, 2004) 
was the object of a methodological critique that cast serious doubt on the suitability 
of the ‘quasi-experiment’ used to generate the regression estimates. Mangan and 
Johnston (1999) also derived statistically significant coefficients in only a small 
proportion of their estimates, and cast doubt on the policy significance of their 
findings, given a range of other potential determinants. The same consideration also 
applies to Junankar et.al. (2000) who argue that only two significant elasticities 
emerged from a large number of estimations. 
 
The Australian situation is not readily comparable with that in the UK because of the 
federal structure and the existence of regulated wage scales for other employees, 
which makes Australia closer to a country such as the Netherlands or France, where 
a minimum wage co-exists with extended industry agreements. 
 
On balance, there seems to be little consensus either on results or methodology in 
Australia. The differences between the Australian situation and the UK also limit the 
direct policy significance of the Australian studies for the UK. 
 
d. New Zealand 
 
New Zealand introduced a system of enforceable wage floors set by statutory 
authority in 1894. In its modern form, under the Minimum Wage Act of 1983, a 
                                               
13
 For full-time 18-year old males in manufacturing there was a short-run elasticity of -3.1 and for full-
time females in retailing a long-run elasticity of -2.05. 
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national statutory minimum wage of $2.50 per hour14 was set for workers aged 20 
orover. During the 1980s this was accompanied by sectoral legal floors, usually 
above the statutory minimum wage, for industries covered by union bargaining 
awards.15   
 
This ended with the introduction by the National Party of radical changes to 
employment relations through the Employment Contracts Act (ECA), 1991, intended 
to reconfigure relationships between employers and trade unions. The statutory 
minimum wage became the only legal wage floor: a youth minimum wage, 60 per 
cent of the adult minimum, was introduced for 16-19 year-olds in 1994, partly in 
response to the removal of some ‘basic labour market protections’ by the ECA 
(Maloney and Pacheco, 2009). Aside from that, rises in the minimum wage were 
modest until 1999, and its value fell slightly in real terms and relative to other wages. 
 
The adult minimum wage applies to all employees aged 16 or over who are not new 
entrants or trainees. There is also a new entrants’ minimum wage which applies to 
employees aged 16 and 17, unless they have completed 200 hours (or three 
months’) employment, whichever is the shorter; or they supervise other staff. It does 
not apply to trainees (see below). There is also a training minimum wage that applies 
to employees aged 16 and over engaged in recognised industry training involving at 
least 60 credits a year.  
 
The ECA was replaced in 2000 by the Employment Relations Act (ERA), 2000, 
introduced by the Labour and Alliance government. Under the Labour government 
(1999-2008) the minimum wage rose in real terms by 32.9 per cent (Maloney and 
Pacheco, 2009). Changes were made in 2001 entailing a large rise in the minimum 
wage for young people, creating an ‘ideal opportunity’ for a ‘natural experiment’ 
(Hyslop and Stillman, 2007) on the effects on the youth labour market.  
 
In 2001, the position on youth minimum wages was changed in two respects.  
                                               
14
 The exchange rate of the NZ $ to the £ in August 2010 was $1 = £0.45 (£1 = $2.22) (£1 = $ 2.30 in 
Aug. 1983). 
15
 ‘Awards’ functioned like extended collective agreements (Freeman, 2006). Chapple (1997) notes 
that up to 20 per cent of award minima were below the statutory minimum wage in the mid-1980s. 
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The age of eligibility for the adult minimum wage was lowered to 18 in March 2001; 
this effectively raised the minimum wage for 18 and 19 year olds by 69 per cent 
(Hyslop and Stillman, 2007). Subsequent increases to the adult minimum wage of 
3.9 per cent in 2002 and 6.3 per cent in 2003 raised the minimum wage for people in 
this age group by 87 per cent between 2000 and 2003, compared with the 13 per 
cent for adults on the minimum wage. In absolute terms, the increases were as 
follows: 
 
Effective date Adults 18-19 year-olds 16-17 year-olds 
6 March 2000 7.55 4.55 4.55 
5 March 2001 7.70 7.70 5.40 
18 March 2002 8.00 8.00 6.40 
24 March 2003 8.50 8.50 6.80 
Source: Hyslop and Stillman (2007) 
 
The minimum rate for 16 and 17 year olds was raised in two steps (in March 2001/2) 
to 80 per cent of the adult rate, raising the minimum rate for this group by 41 per cent 
over a two-year period. The subsequent 6.3 per cent increase in 2003 raised the rate 
overall by 49 per cent between 2000 and 2003.16 Hyslop and Stillman note that 
‘these large and focused changes provide an ideal opportunity for studying the 
effects of minimum wage policy on the youth labour market.’ 
 
The statutory minimum wage is the only legal wage floor. The aim is to ‘set a wage 
floor that balances the protection of the lowest paid with employment impacts’ 
(Department of Labour, 2009b). The minimum wage is payable to full-time, part-time 
or casual employees; to home-workers; and to workers paid wholly or partly by 
commission or on a piece-rate. A range of criteria have been set by the Cabinet for 
guiding the annual assessment of the minimum wage. These include ‘any 
(dis)incentive effects for young people to choose low paid employment or additional 
education and training’ (Department of Employment, 2009).  
                                               
16
 This rate was then raised to 100 per cent of the adult rate from March 2008, except for new 
entrants and those on approved training programmes. No research has yet appeared on this change. 
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Over half of those earning the minimum wage are 18-24 years of age, and a ‘high 
proportion’ of those aged 16 and 17 are also ‘paid at or near the minimum wage’ 
(Department of Labour, 2009b).  
 
The age dimension for determining status as a minimum wage earner is discussed in 
Pacheco (2007). She concluded that age was a crucial determining factor, and that 
the impact of minimum wages on young people had risen substantially between 
1998 and 2007. For 16-17 year-olds, the proportion of this age group being paid 
below the minimum wage rose from 4.67 per cent in 1997 to 18.84 per cent in 2004; 
and for 18-19 year-olds, from 2.39 per cent to 11.3 per cent.17 Percentages for older 
age-groups fell over the same period (from 4.67 per cent to 3.35 per cent for 20-24 
year-olds and from 3.17 per cent to 1.99 per cent for 25-26 year-olds. Conversely, 
the proportion of all sub-minimum wage workers accounted for by individuals aged 
16-17 rose from 1.45 per cent in 1997-1999 to 16.02 per cent in the period 2002-
2004; and this age group accounted for 12 per cent of all minimum wage workers by 
2002-2004, an increase from 0.68 per cent in the period 1997-99. 
 
Compulsory education in New Zealand extends to age 16, and all young people 
have a right to full-time education until the age of 19. The youth unemployment rate 
is relatively low at 16.6 per cent (compared to a total unemployment rate of 6.3 per 
cent) and almost three-quarters of those aged 15 to 19 are in education.    
 Income improvement, welfare and productivity  
Hyslop and Stillman (2007), which dealt with the relationship between changes in the 
minimum wage, hours worked, employment, study rates, and other outcomes, is the 
only study that considered incomes. Combined wage, hours, and employment 
changes led to ‘measurable increases’ in labour earnings and total income of 
teenagers relative to young adults (captured here as log earnings). The study 
concluded that there were no spillover effects on the wages of young adult workers. 
However, as noted below, some of the welfare effect was due to an increase in 
hours worked by young people (higher labour supply responding to higher wages) 
that could prejudice educational enrolment.   
                                               
17
 This is attributed to poorer enforcement. 
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Only one paper (Hyslop and Stillman) considers welfare effects on young people 
(there is wider literature in New Zealand on the minimum wage as an anti-poverty 
measure – this is not considered here). This would seem to imply that welfare (and 
related) effects should yield to employment effects but is this warranted? For a 
normative theoretical discussion and model, see Lee and Saez (2010). 
 
McLaughlin (2009), basing his work on an institutional perspective, has argued that 
productivity gains are possible (in New Zealand) consequent on a minimum wage, 
provided appropriate institutions exist to facilitate this.18 McLaughlin proposes 
legislative support for a‘re-institutionalisation’ of industry bargaining arrangements to 
encourage firm strategies away from cost-minimisation approaches towards ‘long-
run dynamic efficiency’. He details the failures of voluntary efforts at coordination on 
training, despite considerable government support for the costs of employer-
delivered training (low take-up, deadweight effects, etc.). 
 
 Effects on Young Workers’ Employment 
Chapple (1997) responded to earlier work using time-series by Maloney (1995), who 
had found small negative employment elasticity.  Chapple’s work focused mainly on 
the impact of minimum wages on young adult workers, and used national time-series 
data complemented by panel data intended to gauge industry effects (as a proxy for 
impacts on the lower end of the wage distribution). The period covered was 1980-
1997 and the age group was 20-24 year olds (as this study pre-dated some 
important changes to the minimum wage). 
 
The results were inconclusive: ‘it is difficult to isolate a robust significant impact of 
minimum wages on employment’ (Chapple, 1997). Using his preferred regression 
specification, Chapple proposed a long-run elasticity for this age group of -0.177. 
However, this over-predicted employment for this age-group: the author conjectured 
this might be explicable by rising returns to education leading individuals to switch 
                                               
18
 Higher productivity might raise welfare and the long-run production potential of the economy by 
facilitating movement to a ‘high road’ strategy, but this would not necessarily contradict short-term 
employment stagnation if productivity enabled the same output to be achieved with the same number 
of workers. 
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from employment to training: however, there was no independent corroboration of 
returns to training for the period cited by the study. 
 
When the whole period was broken into two (1980-88 and 1989-1997), there was a 
small positive but statistically insignificant elasticity for the first period and ‘wild 
variations’ in the size and sign of the coefficient in the second. Overall, Chapple was 
reluctant to draw firm conclusions – in part because the short duration of the time-
series made it difficult to identify underlying trends and relationships. 
 
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) looked at the impact of the minimum wage on several 
outcomes: compliance; employment rates and hours worked; educational enrolment; 
benefit receipt rates. The method used difference-in-differences to compare 
employment rates of 16-17 and 18-19 year-olds with 20-25 year-olds; regression 
was used to establish relationships between the variables. The study found ‘little, if 
any’ systematic change in the trends around 2001 for teenagers relative to young 
adults’ (Hyslop and Stillman, 2007), with no evidence of adverse effects on youth 
employment immediately after the reform. There was some ‘some weak evidence of 
employment loss by 2003’ of 2 per cent for 18-19 year olds, and 2-4 per cent for 16-
17 year olds. The employment elasticity for 16-17 year olds was -0.1 to -0.2, and  
-0.04 for 18-19 year olds for 2003 (although there was no differential increase in the 
minimum wage for young people in that year).   
 
The studies had difficulty with data collection, notably on enrolment. This was also 
related to the problem of dealing with the flexible boundaries between work 
(measured by hours), employment status, and education or training status. Time-
series were short, but possibly offset by the ‘natural experiment’ element which 
allowed difference-in-differences to be used. 
 
On employment, the only statistically significant result on the preferred regression 
specification was a rise in 2.3 hours for employed 16–17 year olds in 2002. There is 
no evidence to suggest that employers substituted older workers (20-21) for young 
workers to a statistically significant degree. 
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Benefit receipt rates fell from 2000 for 18-19 and 20-25 year olds, but rose slightly for 
16-17 year olds in 2000-2002, before falling in 2003. The authors are sceptical about 
the statistical significance and magnitude of the changes ‘which strike us as being 
simply too large to credibly be attributed solely to the minimum wage’ (Hyslop and 
Stillman, 2007). It is difficult to interpret this proposition, latched onto by Neumark 
and Wascher (2008), without further research. 
 
Unemployment and inactivity rates fell for 18-19 and 20-25 year olds, but were stable 
for 16-17 year olds. The 16-17 year old group was affected by the minimum wage 
change to a greater extent than the 18-19 group, although the increases in the 
minimum wage were greater for this group. This is attributed to ‘better human capital 
characteristics’ of the latter, enabling them to command higher wages. 
 
 Educational enrolment 
Hyslop and Stillman (2007) found evidence of a slight decline in study rates for 16-17 
year olds, but stable or slightly rising study rates for 18-19 and 20-25 year olds. 
Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007) looked at this issue in greater detail. They 
analysed the relationship between enrolment rates and the real minimum wage for 
age-groups between 16 and 24 years. Their measure of enrolment looked at 
enrolment as recorded by an official enrolment survey, rather than the household 
survey used in other studies. In the event, although probably more accurate, it was 
not held to have influenced the overall trend recorded.  
 
Control variables used were education spending (log of the lagged value of 
education spending as percentage of GDP) and a business cycle control 
(unemployment rate of prime-aged males). The assumption here is that education 
spending can influence decisions regarding training (spending as proxy for quality of 
training): this was held to be problematic for New Zealand where spending follows 
demand, but it was included none the less. The business cycle control is based in 
the assumption that young people enter training during a recession. 
 
The results were that education spending had a positive impact on enrolment 
(subject to reservations about the role of education spending in the New Zealand 
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context). On the preferred specification, the effect was statistically significant at 5 per 
cent for 18 and 19 year olds: the coefficients are 0.8655 (18 year olds: standard error 
0.3626) and 0.6751 (19 year olds: standard error 0.3230). 
 
On the impact of rises in the minimum wage, the 16-19 year group exhibited a 
discernible fall in enrolment rates when the (real) minimum wage rose. The fall was 
statistically significant at 1 per cent, and implied a fall of 1.535 per cent in enrolment 
for a 10 per cent increase in the real minimum wage (Coefficient estimate -0.1535. 
Standard error 0.0591). There was no statistically significant relationship between 
rises in the minimum wage and enrolment for 20-24 year-olds. 
 
There was a positive relationship between the introduction of a youth minimum wage 
in 1994 and enrolment. The coefficient is 0.1116, significant at 1 per cent 
significance level. The effect was more marked for the 16-19 year-olds, with a 
statistically significant rise in enrolment in all specifications (between 0.998 per cent 
and 1.526 per cent). The authors conjecture that the introduction of a minimum wage 
had differential impacts on teenagers. For example, teenagers with low skills may 
have prolonged schooling if they found it hard to find employment at the new MW. 
 
There was a strong positive relationship, significant at one per cent, for higher 
enrolment of 16-17 year-olds in response to higher unemployment of adult males: 
the coefficient was 0.2844 for 17 year-olds (standard error 0.0790) 
 
Chapple (1997) found no significant association between industry and 
responsiveness to the minimum wage (intended to test whether the ‘bite’ in relation 
to average wages in an industry affected employment). The introduction of the youth 
minimum wage in 1994 did not appear to have an impact, in contrast to the findings 
of Pacheco and Cruickshank (2007), who noted two phenomena. Firstly, enrolment 
rose on the introduction of a youth minimum wage for 16-19 year olds in 1994 (see 
below under ‘Education enrolment’), and secondly, there was a discernible fall in 
enrolment rates for the 16-19 year-olds when the real minimum wage subsequently 
rose. 
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 Compliance 
Hyslop and Stillman found a possible increase in non-compliance by employers 
(measured by the proportion of teenagers reporting sub-minimum wages). However, 
part of this was attributed to random measurement errors in reported wages. Official 
reports noted ‘low and stable numbers of minimum wage compliance complaints, 
and very few breaches’ (Hyslop and Stillman, 2007). However, a higher rate of non-
compliance is suggested by Pacheco (2007), who found a significant rise in the 
number of sub-minimum wage workers in these age groups. The proportion of all 
sub-minimum wage workers accounted for by 16-17 year olds rose from 1.45 per 
cent in 1997-99 to 16.02 per cent for 2002-2004. 
 
 Conclusions 
The literature indicates the following conclusions. First, there were no or very small 
effects of the minimum wage on employment for the 20-24 age group.  There were 
varied findings on the impact of rises in the minimum wage on employment for 
younger age groups, with estimates ranging from ‘non-robust’, to zero or fairly weak 
negative effects (Chapple, Hyslop and Stillman). The employment elasticity for 16-17 
year-olds in 2003 in Hyslop and Stillman (2007) was -0.1 to -0.2: this is consistent 
with other literature.  There were negative effects on enrolment for 16-19 year-olds 
when the minimum wage rose. Introducing a minimum wage had varied effects as 
the age-group is heterogeneous in terms of skills and life trajectory. The 1994 
change led to an increase in school enrolment. 
 
The empirical work mainly tests the proposition that a minimum wage should have 
disemployment effects. Any deviation from this (a positive elasticity or lack of 
robustness of a coefficient) is referred for explanation to other theories that might 
modify ‘classical’ effects (heterogeneity, monopsony, efficiency wages, re-
arrangement of reward, returns to education and training, preferences of actors etc).  
None of these theories are themselves put forward for empirical examination, yet 
they would appear to be important for policy, and ascertaining actor preferences and 
perspectives through qualitative work rather crucial. This is particularly the case 
when using results derived from systems that might differ in a range of ways from the 
UK. 
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e. United Kingdom 
 
The National Minimum Wage was introduced into the UK in April 1999.  While there 
had been earlier attempts at minimum wage regulation in the UK through sector-
specific Wages Councils, these were finally abolished in 1993 except for the 
Agricultural Wages Councils and the introduction of the National Minimum Wage 
followed a period when no statutory minimum had been in place. At the time of its 
implementation in 1999 there were two main rates – the adult rate from age 22 and a 
lower rate covering those aged 18 to 21 and those adults aged 22 and over in 
training in the first six months of a new job, the so-called ‘development rate’. The 
development rate was abandoned in 2006 for those aged 22 and over. Apprentices 
under age 19 and those apprentices aged 19 and over who were within the first 12 
months of their training, were exempt from the National Minimum Wage (NMW). 
 
In 2004 a new third rate was introduced for those aged 16-17 and in October 2010 
the adult age was reduced from age 22 to 21 and a new minimum rate introduced for 
those employed apprentices exempt from the minimum wage. 
 
Unlike some other countries where minimum wage age rates are fixed proportions of 
the full adult wage, in the UK the three rates are reviewed separately by the 
independent Low Pay Commission.  
 
The most recent research for the Low Pay Commission (LPC 2010) shows that the 
minimum wage has had a major impact upon the earnings of young people. High 
proportions of young people are paid at the youth and adult minimum rates, and 
earnings at the lowest decile remain at least level with the minimum wage. Since 
1997 the median earnings of young workers have grown at a very similar rate to 
older workers, meaning that the pay gap between younger and older workers has 
more or less remained the same (Office of National Statistics - ONS - 2010). The 
distribution of earnings for young workers (i.e. 16-24), however, tends to be much 
narrower than for other age groups and indeed has narrowed since 1997 by 19 per 
cent. The ONS suggests that this narrowing of the distribution among young workers 
may be due to the introduction of the NMW because young people are more likely to 
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be earning below the adult NMW than other age groups and hence will have 
particularly benefited.   
 
Although the size of the UK working age population increased from 35 to 38 million 
between 1992 and 2008, the proportion of young people aged under 25 has changed 
relatively little (ONS 2009). The proportion of young people aged 16-17 is 4.1 per 
cent of the total and the 18-24 group is 15.1 per cent. Nearly half of all young 
workers are employed in either retail or hospitality, although the retail sector makes 
less use of youth rates than the hospitality sector. IDS (2009) found that age-related 
pay was common in the fast food, restaurant and pub sectors at around 80 per cent 
of employers.  There is some evidence that wage for age rates were in decline 
before the introduction of the NMW but that employers may now be making more 
use of youth rates in line with the provisions of the NMW. However, practice appears 
to vary between sectors. 
 
A major concern of the LPC is that the NMW should not provide an incentive for 
young people to leave education or training. Research for the LPC (De Coulon et al, 
2010) found that youth participation in education was positively affected by high 
youth unemployment with young people deciding to delay entering the labour market 
by participating in education instead. The LPC (2010) notes that participation in 
education has increased significantly since the start of the recession in 2008. 
Quarterly LFS data indicated that the proportion of 16-17 year olds and 18-24 year 
olds in full-time equivalents rose by 4.2 and 2.0 percentage points respectively 
between the third quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009. This compares with 
annual increases of around 1 per cent or less before the recession.  Participation 
rates in FTE have been increasing since before the NMW was implemented and 
research for the LPC (De Coulon et al, 2010) found that the decision of young people 
aged 16-17 to stay on in FTE was unaffected by local wage rates. The research also 
found that the introduction of the 16-17 Year Old Rate in 2004 appeared to have had 
no impact upon participation rates. The recession has not led to an increase in the 
proportion of young people aged 16-17 who are not in education, employment or 
training (NEETs) but there has been an increase in NEETs aged 18-24.  
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Analysis of the effect of the NMW on the employment of those below age 21 is 
complicated by the fact that some 40 per cent of 18-21 year olds are in full-time 
education (FTE) and of these the majority (55 per cent) are inactive (LPC 2009). 
However, around 45 per cent of those in FTE are also in employment. In contrast, 
some 70 per cent of 18-21 year olds not in FTE are employed. Clearly those working 
while in FTE are of less concern to the LPC than those who are not, because they 
are in effect primarily engaged in preparing themselves for skilled work at a later 
date.  
 
Since 2001 the employment rate of 18-21 year olds not in FTE has been in general 
decline with both inactivity and unemployment increasing sharply between 2004 and 
2006. There were some signs of recovery from 2007 but there has been a significant 
decline in the employment rate of 18-20 year olds since the second quarter of 2008 
to 65 per cent (LPC 2010). The unemployment rate of 18-20 year olds has also risen 
significantly to over 22 per cent (LPC 2010).  For those aged 16-17 the situation is 
even worse. Between May 2008 and November 2009, the unemployment rate of 16-
17 year olds rose by 7.7 per cent to 32.9 per cent. The LPC makes clear, however, 
that the decline in employment of 16-17 year olds started in 1998, well before the 
advent of the NMW 16-17 wage rate.  In fact, before the recession started there was 
some evidence that employment and unemployment rates for these young people 
not in FTE had stabilised and that the introduction of the NMW 16-17 age rate had 
had no observable negative effect.  
 
 Literature 
In terms of research on the effects of the UK NMW wage upon youth employment, 
there is little published work apart from the studies commissioned by the LPC. Most 
of the econometric studies of the employment effects have not specifically looked at 
young people’s employment, which is perhaps surprising.  
 
A paper by Stewart (2002) evaluates the impact on employment of the introduction of 
the NMW in 1999 by using the geographical variation in wages. The results indicate 
that, although the minimum wage had differential wage-distribution effects across the 
140 geographical areas examined, employment growth after its introduction was not 
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significantly lower in areas of the country with a high proportion of low-wage workers 
from that in areas with a low proportion of such workers. The paper uses data from 
the Labour Force Survey, the Annual Business Inquiry and the New Earnings 
Survey. The estimates of employment effects were broken down by two age groups 
– all those aged 18 and above and youths only (18-21). The research found the 
difference-in-differences estimate for those aged 18-21 to be negative but also 
insignificant.  Nuemark and Wascher (2007) have criticised this paper for only 
looking at a ‘one-year window’ surrounding the introduction of the NMW and 
suggesting that lagged effects have therefore not been included. A further paper by 
Stewart (2004a) estimated the employment effects of the introduction of the NMW in 
April 1999 and subsequent upratings in 2000 and 2001. It used a difference-in-
differences estimator based on the position in the wage distribution. The individual-
level longitudinal data was taken from matched Labour Force Surveys. For the 
upratings an adjusted estimator was introduced to allow for the possible differential 
response to the change in the macro employment trend. The paper provides 
estimates for four demographic groups – male and female adults (22-59) and youths 
(18-21). Only for adult women was there a negative, although statistically 
insignificant, effect on employment. Stewart found no significant adverse effect on 
employment for either the introduction or the upratings for any of the groups 
concerned.  
 
The only major study looking specifically at the impact of the transition from the 
development rate to the adult rate at age 22 is a study by Dickens et al (2010) of the 
impact on employment of the age related increases in the NMW. They used a 
regression discontinuity approach that compared labour market outcomes for those 
just a few months above and below age 22 (the old adult rate) to consider the 
employment outcomes of low-paid individuals and the impact upon unemployment 
and inactivity. The assumption is that those workers aged a few months above and 
below the NMW age boundary will have similar attributes and hence the only 
difference is the NMW rate received. The NMW rate increases by around 20 per cent 
on reaching 22. This provides an experimental situation whereby those over 22 are 
receiving the treatment (i.e. are in receipt of the adult rate) and those below 22 (i.e. 
not in receipt of the adult rate) are the control group. Estimates are reported using 
both parametric and non-parametric techniques. A number of tests for robustness 
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and falsification were also undertaken. These test the sensitivity of the results to a 
model specification and also test for changing labour market outcomes at other age 
thresholds and in years prior to the introduction of the NMW. The data is taken from 
the Labour Force Survey from April 1999 to March 2009. 
 
The data shows a positive and statistically significant employment effect at age 22 
for low-skilled workers. The estimated effect is that the employment rate increases 
by about five percentage points at age 22 – from around 55 per cent to 60 per cent. 
Results for both men and women are both statistically significant (a four percentage 
point increase for men and a six percentage point increase from women). These 
findings were robust to a number of checks including changing the functional form of 
the regression; varying the total age range over which the labour market outcomes 
are analysed; excluding those aged exactly 22; and allowing the impact on 
employment to be different in each year. The results were also subject to a number 
of falsification tests. No significant employment changes could be found at ages 21 
or 23 nor could an effect at age 22 in the period prior to the introduction of the NMW 
be found. The non-parametric data also points to a similar conclusion but the 
estimated employment effects are even larger.  
 
Both unemployment and inactivity rates fall at age 22 among low-skilled workers. 
The estimated effects are statistically significant and suggest both fall by around 2.5 
percentage points. There are separate effects for men and women – for men there is 
a fall in unemployment while among women the fall is more in inactivity.  While the 
findings are robust in indicating a fall in unemployment and inactivity, the authors 
state that ‘it is not entirely clear what mechanism is driving these results’ (Dickens et 
al, 2010). They hypothesise that there is labour supply effect at age 22 – in other 
words the higher level of the NMW at age 22 makes it worth engaging with the 
labour market. An alternative explanation may be that employers who wish to employ 
adult workers chose an arbitrary age at which they consider a worker reaches 
adulthood. However, parametric regression discontinuity analysis of employment at 
age 21 in the period before the NMW found no evidence of discontinuity. Any labour 
demand effect that existed prior to the NMW may not be large enough to show up in 
the data.   
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In terms of policy the research found no evidence that increases in the NMW at age 
22 adversely affect employment for those aged 21. Indeed, the results show that 
labour supply may well increase among this group resulting in a higher employment 
rate.  
 
 Effects on participation in education 
Two studies were conducted for the LPC in 2004 which considered the effect of the 
introduction of a third level minimum wage for 16-17 year olds. The first of these, by 
Dickerson and Jones (2004), provided quantitative evidence to inform the 
Commission’s decision on whether to recommend a new lower rate. Using data from 
the Youth Cohort Study (YCS), a formal model of the decision between education 
and employment at age 16 was developed and calibrated. Using a range of 
assumptions regarding the distribution of ‘ability’, the predicted impact of a minimum 
wage on education and employment participation was calculated. Using an 
individual’s GCSE attainment as the key indicator of ability, the research predicted 
that a wage set between £2.50 and £4.00 per hour would have a negligible effect on 
education participation. 
 
The second report for the Low Pay Commission, by Frayne and Goodman (2004), 
reviewed the impact of the 16-17 year old rate on employment and education 
outcomes. Using data from a large sample of 16 to 17 year olds living in relatively 
deprived urban areas collected for the evaluation of the Education Maintenance 
Allowance, they estimated that for every one per cent increase in the 16-17 year old 
age rate would result in a 3.6 per cent decrease in employment hours among the 
group. They also estimated that an increase in the wage tends to lead to a shift out 
of school and into the labour market, and also towards combining school and 
employment. However, the number who would change their behaviour in this way as 
a result of the NMW was not found to be significant.     
 
Further work on the effect of the NMW on staying-on rates in education was 
produced for the Low Pay Commission in January 2010. This work, by De Coulon et 
al (2010), used Local Authorities as local labour markets to compare the impact of 
the introduction of the 16-17 year old rate in October 2004 on staying-on rates. The 
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research found no evidence of reduced participation rates among youths in low wage 
areas compared to high wage areas. It also found no evidence that the large 
increase in the 16-17 NMW rate in 2006 had any impact either. The authors 
concluded that the decision to stay on for 16 year olds does not appear to be 
affected by higher wages on offer as a result of the introduction of the 16-17 rate.   
 
 Employers’ Views 
A paper by Lucas and Keegan (2007) explores the distinctiveness of young workers 
aged 16 to 17 in terms of employers’ treatment of them. This research used a sub-
sample of hospitality businesses in North Wales and was based on a series of semi-
structured interviews about firms’ pay and employment practices. This included a 
systematic method to enable managers to provide some justifiable measures of job 
content and perceptions of the personal attributes of 16 and 17 year old workers 
compared to older workers. The authors question the presumption that young 
workers are a distinctive group with reference to contemporary notions of skill and 
training requirements. Their view is that employers’ employment and pay practices 
‘both reflect and reinforce the presumption of distinctiveness in the workplace for 16-
17 year old labour that is almost wholly student-based’ (Lucas and Keegan 2007). 
 
 Conclusions 
Despite Neumark and Wascher’s comment that the UK literature on the impact of 
minimum wages on employment is probably the most numerous after the USA, in the 
case of the impact upon young people the literature is limited. Only a few of the 
studies of the impact of the NMW on employment have touched on the effects upon 
young workers and there have been few dedicated studies of the impact on young 
people’s employment. What evidence has emerged appears to challenge the view 
that young people are particularly affected, although there is some evidence that 
both the separation of young people from the full adult rate and indeed the level of 
the rates set for young workers may have led to this absence of effect. There also 
appears to be little evidence for a negative impact of the NMW upon young people’s 
participation in education.   
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3.3 COORDINATED MARKET ECONOMIES 
 
f. France 
 
Minimum wage regulation in France has a long history. In 1915 a law was created 
fixing minimum wages for textile workers and in 1936 covenants were initiated 
setting minimum wages by region and by qualifications. There were also the 
ministerial decisions from 1946 onwards (Cahuc et al, 2008). In 1950 a law on 
collective bargaining mandated representatives of the social dialogue (la 
Commission supérieure des conventions collectives) to agree a national minimum 
wage for all professions. This was the SMIG (salaire minimum national 
interprofessional garanti). However the social partners failed to reach an agreement 
and therefore the government set the SMIG (Cahuc et al, 2008). The SMIG was 
indexed in relation to the family consumption index (l’indice des 213 articles). After 
the social unrest of 1968, the French government decided to boost the SMIG by 35 
per cent, and to reform the minimum wage system into the SMIC (salaire minimum 
interprofessionel de croissance) from 1970 on. Since 2010, the decision on the 
increase in the SMIC is reached through the advice of a panel of experts.  
 
The adult minimum wage is paid at age 18. Certain categories of young person can 
be paid a reduced SMIC, provided they have worked in a sector for less than six 
months. Those aged 16 receive 80 per cent and those aged 17 receive 90 per cent 
of the adult rate. Minimum wage workers are mostly found in companies with less 
than 10 employees (28.7 per cent compared to 10.6 per cent for those with more 
than 10 employees). Most ‘smicards’ are young female low skilled workers. 
Employees younger than 25 years old are paid at SMIC level twice as frequently as 
those older than 25 (Cahuc et al, 2008). In 2009 unemployment among 15-24 year 
olds was 22.4 per cent (OECD 2010) but in France over 90 per cent of those aged 
15 to 19 are in education, so youth unemployment largely affects those over age 19.  
 
Although France has probably the most stringent statutory national minimum wage 
mechanism in the world (Gautié 2008), there is weak enforcement on employers. 
Unionisation is weak (5 per cent in the private sector), labour inspections are scarce; 
sanctions when someone refuses work offered are weak compared to other OECD 
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countries (Askenazy et al 2009). The most common way in which the minimum wage 
level is circumvented is through unpaid overtime (Gautié 2008). The RSA (Revenu 
de Solidarité Active) acts as a guaranteed income increase for those taking up 
employment. Since June 2009 the RSA has replaced the RMI (Revenu minimum 
d’insertion) but, like the RMI, people under 25 years old without family 
responsibilities are not entitled to the RSA.  
 
 Literature 
Research since 1990 regarding the impact of minimum wages on youth employment 
(15-24 year olds) in France is limited. Bazen and Martin (1991) argue that the 
conventional Mincer model to estimate employment effects is not an appropriate 
one, since it assumes that only young people are affected by the minimum wage and 
that only the SMIC level impacts the income of young workers. Bazen and Martin 
(1991) suggest that first an assessment of the impact of minimum wage changes on 
average wages must be made and then a vector calculated for the demand for 
labour using the average wage, and finally that these two measures should be used 
to calculate the impact of SMIC changes on employment. The authors re-examine 
time series data for 1963-1986 (annual earnings net of employees’ social security 
contributions). They find a real wage elasticity of -0.37 for young people, while for 
adults this is smaller and insignificant. They conclude that while increases in the 
SMIC’s value exert an upward pressure on the real earnings of young workers, 
findings that increases in labour costs have had a negative impact on youth 
employment are not very robust: they estimate the elasticity to be between -0.1 and -
0.2. Bazen and Martin (1991) advise that if the government wishes to use the SMIC 
to improve youth employment, it ought to drop the July upratings and simply maintain 
the automatic indexation. An alternative they suggest is to introduce sub-minimum 
wage rates for young workers. 
 
Benhayoun (1994) responded to Bazen and Martin with a study updating his 1990 
research cited in Bazen and Martin (1991), since the data set for 1974-91 had been 
revised. Benhayoun uses Mincer equations and concludes that a relationship 
between minimum wages and youth employment seems to exist but is very fragile 
and statistically not significant. Contradicting the findings of Bazen and Martin 
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(1991), Benhayoun (1994) was led to conclude from this lack of robustness that 
introducing sub-minimum wage rates for young people was not a good idea. An ILO 
study on minimum wages (Ghellab 1998) concludes that as French studies in the 
1990s found much smaller and often insignificant negative impacts of minimum wage 
increases on youth employment, there might be other factors at play such as 
recessions or weak economies.  
 
Not included in the ILO survey is the research by Abowd et al (1997), on the relation 
between one’s position in the wage distribution and the probability of transition from 
and to non-employment. Abowd et al (1997) use French data to calculate the impact 
of an increase in minimum wage on the probability of transition to non employment 
and finds that for 20-24 year olds the elasticity is -1.2 for men and -1.25 for women. 
They find a considerably stronger elasticity for men aged 25-30, namely -4.8. 
Comparable US data is used to calculate the impact of a decrease in minimum 
wages on the probability of a transition from non-employment to employment. They 
find an elasticity of -4.2 for men aged 20-24 and -4.8 for women (for ages 25-30 that 
is respectively -5.9 for men and -7.1 for women) in the USA. This leads to two 
conclusions: firstly that whilst both the French and American young workers 
experience a significant effect of minimum wages on employment, the French young 
workers (under 25 years old) do not experience as large an impact of a minimum 
wage increase as the American workers. Secondly that the p-values of Abowd et al’s 
(1997) findings show this effect is much less significant  for French young workers 
than they are for the US young workers (respectively in the 0.5 and the 0.0001 
ranges).  
 
According to Neumark and Wascher (2007), the evidence regarding overall 
employment effects of the minimum wage upon young workers is mixed. They argue 
that the combination of labour market institutions in France make it less likely that 
minimum wages will have detectable disemployment effects upon young workers.   
 
 Conclusion 
While the impact of the SMIC increases on youth employment is the theme we are 
most concerned with here, closely related to that is what some authors define as 
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policies that effectively exclude young people from the labour market. Bazen and 
Martin (1991) have suggested specific SMIC levels for young workers while 
Benhayoun (1994) counters that idea. Cahuc et al (2008) states that the fact that 
people younger than 25 years old have no right to the RMI effectively excludes them 
from the labour market. Cahuc et al (2008) call for reforms (which were already 
staged in 2008 with the planning for the RSA) aimed at making social benefits more 
consistent, easier to understand and beneficial for 18-25 year olds. This latter 
suggestion was not taken up by the RSA reforms. The RSA is not obtainable by 
people younger than 25 years old without family responsibilities. 
 
g. Spain 
 
The Salario Minimo Interprofesional (Inter-professional Minimum Wage: SMI) was 
established by the Spanish government on 17 January 1963. Until then, minimum 
wages in the Spanish economy depended upon both the type of economic activity 
(sector) and occupation. The new SMI system established the minimum wage for 
any worker from any sector of activity and occupation. The universal character of the 
minimum wage was then ratified within the framework of the new constitutional 
democratic regime (1975 to date) in 1980. The Spanish minimum wage is set by 
statute but is determined by the Council of Ministers after consultation with trade 
unions and employer organisations. The minimum wage is paid in full from age 16, 
although there is a training rate at 75 per cent of the full rate. 
 
It is estimated that the minimum wage has continuously decreased in relation to the 
average salary in the Spanish economy since it was established (Gonzalez Guemes 
and Perez Dominguez, 2002). Despite this fact, minimum earnings observed for the 
youth labour market have steadily increased during the last decades in relation to the 
minimum wage for the adult labour market. Hence the traditional distinction between 
minimum earnings by age groups (between youth and adults) has tended to 
disappear. Empirical evidence seems to show however that the process of 
convergence in the different minimum earnings in Spain has entailed the loss (or 
non-creation) of thousands of jobs. The youth unemployment rate (age 15 to 24) in 
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2009 was 37.9 per cent. Around 79 per cent of 15 to 19 year olds are in education 
and 34 per cent of 20 to 24 year olds.  
 
Since 2004, the Spanish government has tried to increase the minimum wage, in 
such a way that it can recover its purchasing power (which decreased in previous 
years) while at the same time protecting employment creation. Until the recent 
economic crisis, the Spanish government pursued a target of raising the minimum 
wage to €800 per month (on the basis of 14 payments per year) by 2012, that is, in 
line with the objectives set by the European Social Charter by which the minimum 
wage should represent 60 per cent of the average salary in the economy.    
 
 Literature 
All of the papers reviewed dealt with the employment effects of the minimum wage 
upon young people. Neoclassical thinking and the methodologies preferred by it 
were utilised in all of the papers examined. In one sense this explains the critical 
view observed in most papers in relation to (concrete or planned) government 
intervention in the labour market and related regulations. The group of scholars 
working on the field in Spain is small and homogenous - most studies were led by 
one or two of these scholars – which gives the impression that studies on this field 
and their findings are generally the same. Although at least two of the papers 
reviewed were commissioned by the government, they invariably present a critical 
neo-classical appraisal of government interventions that attempt to prove the 
negative effects of minimum wages on employment.  
 
 Effect of young workers’ employment 
Dolado et al (1996) use panel data to investigate the effects of the minimum wage on 
six low wage sectors. Using regression of sector-specific changes in employment 
and employment for 16-19 year olds on changes in the relative minimum wage, 
cyclical controls and fixed sector effects, they show a positive and statistically 
significant elasticity of 0.08 for total employment but a negative elasticity for the 16-
19 year olds (-0.15). They also found stronger disemployment effects for the young 
workers in the sectors where the minimum wage has most bite. Dolado et al (1996) 
also refer to another study which looked at the effect of the large rise of 83 per cent 
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in the minimum wage for 16 year olds in 1990. Using regional data to regress region-
specific changes in youth employment between 1990 and 1994, they found that 
strong evidence that employers substituted 19 year olds for 16 year olds after the 
large increase for 16-17 year olds. This finding was not reflected in the data for 20-
24 year olds which indicates that the results show the change in the minimum wage, 
rather than changes in demand for labour. The conclusion was that rises in the 
minimum wage reduced employment for those aged 16-17 years old.  
 
The most rigorous recent work within this classical paradigm nevertheless shows no 
effect of minimum wages on youth employment (Cebrian et al, 2010). Estimations 
undertaken on the effects of the rise in minimal wage on employment from 
Economically Active Population Survey (for the 1981-2009 period), showed no 
significant effect of changes in the Katz Index on youth employment. The authors 
were particularly concerned however with two specific issues. First, the possibility 
that a rise of the minimum wage that exceeds the productivity’s growth of un-skilled 
workers may trigger a process of substitution of unskilled for skilled workers - as the 
relative cost of the latter decreases with the rise of minimum wage. Second, that the 
effects of a rapid rise of the minimum wage (e.g. from €600 to €800 per month as 
originally set by the Spanish Government for the period 2088-2012) within a context 
of economic downturn may further increase the trend to shed employment.  
 
The two papers on Spain examined the regional and seasonal nature of much youth 
employment (Gonzalez and Guemes, 1997; Blazquez et al, 2009). The second study 
shows that these act as important mediating variables on the effects of the minimum 
wage over time on youth employment. The authors of this study conclude that, ‘there 
is no definite evidence of any negative effects of minimum wage on youth 
employment in Spain in the period under study (i.e. 2000-2008)’ (Blazquez et al, 
2009) when existing regional differences, the existence of lags effects and the 
seasonal variations observed in youth employment are taken into account. While this 
finding can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of a monopsonistic labour 
market, they continue, ‘it can also be compatible with a perfect competitive structure 
where a certain dynamic factor and a structural change in labour market coexist 
together’ (original text in English).  
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 Conclusion 
Some findings (Blazquez et al, 2009) appear very specific to the Spanish situation 
and are unlikely to provide a reliable guide to policy making in Britain. Overall, 
however, the body of work on Spain provides no consistent evidence of negative 
employment effects for young workers. Neither the effect on participation in 
education nor training effects are considered in any of the reviewed papers.     
 
h. Greece 
 
Over the last thirty years Greece has implemented policies in favour of a welfare 
state in an attempt to mitigate the problem of wage and income inequality. The 
minimum wage is not legislated but is determined through collective bargaining. The 
government intervenes in this process through an arbitration procedure rather than 
through legislation.19 The national minimum wage is set by collective bargaining in 
the National General Collective Labour Agreement (NGCLA), which applies to 
employees of the private sector as well as to employees in public enterprises and to 
non-permanent civil servants. Two parties participate in the NGCLA, namely the 
members of the General Confederation of Greek Workers20 (GCGW) and 
representatives of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV in Greek). The 
duration of this agreement was one year but the July 2010 agreement is for three 
years. It constitutes the basis for the contractual agreements set at the industry and 
sectoral level.  Payment rates below those agreed in the NGCLA were considered 
invalid.  In case of a collective dispute, the arbitration process is used to resolve the 
issue. The arbitration process is gradual, starting with mediation by the Ministry of 
Labour as an initial attempt to resolve the dispute. If this fails then the next step is to 
refer the issue to the system of Compulsory Arbitration Courts (See 
Koutsogeorgopoulou (1994) and Metzitakos and Katsimpas (1971) for further 
                                               
19
 After Greece’s current crisis in public finances and the signing of Memorandum with IMF and EU, 
the arbitration procedure has been under radical consideration. Up to this moment, there has not 
been any final decision regarding this issue. Although a new legislation framework was confirmed 
concerning pension and insurance system in May 2010, the issue of the arbitration procedure has 
been left open to further discussions and negotiations. 
20
 The basic instrument of trade unionism in Greece. 
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information about this process). In July 2010, following the financial crisis, a new 
agreement decided on a freeze in the minimum wage, with increases in line with 
Eurozone inflation for each of the following two years.  A youth sub-minimum wage 
was also introduced for the 15-24 year old age group at 84% of the adult rate, which 
now starts at age 25. Prior to this a single minimum wage had been paid from age 
15.  
 
There is little official evidence concerning the number of workers employed at the 
minimum wage. However, based on figures provided by the Bank of Greece in 1987, 
about 15-20 per cent of the workforce were then paid the minimum wage 
(Koutsogeorgopoulou 1994).  
 
Policy implementation for closing the wage inequality gap in Greece has been 
common, especially after 1981 when Greece had the first socialist government in its 
history. A central manifesto promise in the Socialist Party manifesto was to introduce 
minimum wage indexation. Conceptually, this policy is designed to address two 
issues, first, persistently wide wage differentials and second, the deterioration in 
purchasing power due to a decline in real wages. This indexation operated in a 
gradual manner, offering the highest possible compensation to those at the lower 
salary scale while offering no compensation to those at the upper end of the salary 
scale. This indexation system, known as ATA (in Greek), proved successful in 
reducing wage differentials but it caused another serious side effect which was 
increasing inflationary pressure induced by aggregate demand forces (mainly due to 
wage increases). The inflationary spiral due to the wage indexation system was the 
number one problem in the economic policy agenda at that time, forcing the design 
of a stabilisation program.21 A main action of this program was to devalue the 
drachma by 20 per cent in 1986 in an attempt to generate a downward wage spiral. 
An additional measure taken was the freezing of earnings during the years 1985-
1987. 
                                               
21
 This happened in 1985 just after the re-election of the socialist party. 
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The change in government in 199022 led to the abolition of the wage indexation 
system but trade unions maintained their powerful position in the negotiations over 
collective agreements. Given that the public sector in Greece has been a major 
employer over the last three decades, wage determination has been massively 
influenced by the interplay between trade unions and governmental officers. 23 
Despite critical developments in the international environment24 that offered Greece 
opportunities to get rid of chronic rigidity, the Greek public sector maintained its 
privileged role in the economy. 
 
In Greece the full minimum wage is paid from age 25 but varies depending on the 
length of employment and marital status. The age at which compulsory education 
ends is 14.5 years but 87 per cent of those aged 15 to 19 are in education. The 
youth unemployment rate in 2009 was 25.8 per cent, compared to a total 
unemployment rate of 9.6 per cent.  
 
 Literature 
A recent paper by Karageorgiou (2004) deals with minimum wage effects on youth 
employment.  Using time series techniques and various model specifications, the 
study concludes that for youths older than 19 a minimum wage increase has a 
negative impact on employment while for teenagers the impact of the minimum wage 
is positive in most of the specifications. More specifically, in the linear specification 
the estimates for the effect of minimum wages on youth employment lies within - 
0.15 and - 0.25. However, the statistical magnitude of this effect is not significant.  
Regarding the effect of minimum wages on teenage employment the estimated 
                                               
22
 The conservative party came into office after three consecutive elections within a period of a year, 
still with a marginal parliamentary majority. 
23
 It is very difficult to obtain an accurate figure regarding the numbers of employees in the Greek 
public sector. An unrecorded figure that has been extensively mentioned in the press and thus needs 
to be treated cautiously is about one million, which means about 30 to 33 per cent of the total labour 
force is working in the public sector. 
24
 To name some: the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the adoption of growth and stability as members of 
EMU, and the use of a common currency. These radical changes offered Greece opportunities to 
rationalise the spending and the size of the public sector as well as to promote the international 
expansion of Greek firms. 
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coefficient lies between - 0.09 and 0.68. The precise sign of the estimated coefficient 
depends on whether the specification includes a time trend. But as in the case of 
youth employment all estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant.   
 
The paper, however, does indicate that one effect of the single minimum wage for all 
ages is that employers tend to substitute less expensive teenage trainee employees 
for more expensive young adult employees (and more likely skilled).  
 
 Conclusion 
There is little literature from Greece directly addressing the subject of the effect of 
minimum wages upon the youth labour labour market.  The results of the one paper 
that covers this issue indicate that, while the employment effect on teenagers was 
less than those aged 19 and above, this might indicate displacement of older 
workers by those who could be paid a training wage.  
 
i. Belgium  
 
In Belgium, the minimum wage was not introduced by law but by a collective labour 
agreement in 1975 (Interprofessional CAO/CCT 21). This is called the GGMMI 
(gewaarborgd gemiddeld minimum maandinkomen) or RMMMG (revenu minimum 
mensuel moyen garanti), which means ‘guaranteed average minimum monthly 
income’. In 1988, collective agreement CAO/CCT 43 introduced an age 
differentiation. Workers aged at least 22 with one year’s length of service are entitled 
to the minimum wage. Workers under 21 years old qualify for fixed percentages of 
the minimum wage of those aged 21 with no work experience: 90 per cent at the age 
of 20; 88 per cent at 19; 82 per cent at 18; 76 per cent at 17; and 70 per cent at 16.  
 
The GGMMI/RMMMG is defined as a monthly rate but is based on annual income: in 
an average month the employer cannot pay less than the minimum and most annual 
bonuses enter into the calculation. Collective Agreement 43 is valid for all private 
sector employees nationwide. At the sector level, within the Joint Committees 
(Commission Paritaire), no lower rate can be negotiated. However, higher rates can 
be set, taking either the form of an alternative GGMMI/RMMMG or a lowest wage 
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rate that serves as a de facto minimum.  This practice is relatively common in 
Belgium. 
 
Data (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions for 2006) show 
that 18.5 per cent of all employees (16-64 years of age) earn a net wage of two-
thirds or lower than the median net wage (Marx et al, 2009). For the Flanders region, 
Marx et al (2009) calculated, based on SILC data for 2004, that within the category 
of 16-24 year old workers, 13.4 per cent worked at the minimum wage, 16.9 per cent 
at 10 per cent above minimum wage, 22.3 per cent at 20 per cent above, and 27.9 
per cent at 30 per cent above minimum wage. 
 
The end of compulsory education is at age 18 and over 90 per cent of 15 to 19 year 
olds are in education. The unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds is relatively high in 
Belgium at 21.9 per cent in 2009. The total unemployment rate in 2009 was 8 per 
cent. 
 
Special benefits are available for school leavers. Youngsters can register when 
leaving school and receive unemployment benefits after a waiting period of nine 
months. Until 2000 these benefits were passive, i.e. unconditional on one’s 
willingness to accept a job or active attempts to find work. Since 2000, controls and 
activation policies have been introduced to make the benefits conditional. This was 
accompanied by an ‘activation discourse’ within the context of the ‘active welfare 
state’. In 2004, the federal employment office (RVA) reached agreements with 
regional agencies for labour counselling and training. Those receiving unemployment 
benefits are monitored by the federal agency.  They receive counselling, and are 
offered employment and vocational training trajectories by the regional agencies. 
Sanctions such as losing benefits are applied when job search efforts are deemed 
insufficient.  In the wake of these agreements, dozens of projects have been initiated 
with the young long term unemployed as a target group, some of these as local as 
city level. The OECD (2007) regards these reforms as heading in the right direction, 
but advised Belgian policy makers amongst other things to make the transition from 
school to work less abrupt, and take further steps in ‘activation policy’ towards young 
people who receive unemployment benefit. The report also calls for a further 
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reduction of labour costs for those at the minimum wage, and to remove some 
rigidities in employment regulation. 
 
 Literature 
 ‘Active welfare state’ policies and their impact on the unemployment trap dominate 
minimum wage research in Belgium. De Lathouwer’s (2000) report, published by the 
Centre for Social Policy (Centrum Sociaal Beleid, University of Antwerp), interpreted 
simulations from a previous study by the same organisation (Cantillon et al, 1999, 
commissioned by the Flemish government under the VIONA program) to formulate 
policy advice. Financial incentives of a number of activation policy measures for the 
unemployed, according to family type, were calculated based on data from 1997. 
However, the report does not specify its analysis for each policy measure, because 
the different policy measures have the same outcome for the worker, which is the 
focus of this research, and not for the employer on whom the respective policy 
measures have a different impact. The report’s findings are: 1) that unemployment 
traps exist for single parent families making the transition from unemployment into 
full time employment; 2) that unemployment traps are a major issue for part-time 
work, even with the IGU (income guarantee allowance); and 3) that for those in part 
time work and receiving IGU, there is also a ‘low wage trap’, i.e. there is a financial 
disincentive to transfer into full-time work. Thus the report advises policy makers to 
lower income tax on the lowest wages, reduce employer contributions for the lowest 
wages, and amend the IGU policy. 
 
Cockx et al (2004) use a sample of 15,177 young people between 18-26 years old, 
receiving their first unemployment benefits in 1998 and who had no work experience 
since the end of their studies. Sample data were taken from Data Warehouse, a 
database with data on the professional trajectories of Belgian employees. These 
data comprise a study of the impact of two activation policy measures: 1) 
Voordeelbanenplan / Plan Avantage à l’Embauche VBP/PAE12 (subsidised jobs for 
those who are unemployed for more than 12 months – 75 per cent reduction in 
employer contributions during the first year, 50 per cent in the second), and 2) 
IGU/AGR (income guarantee benefit) and its impact on women’s chances of  finding 
a job. They calculate the ‘hazard rate’ of policy measures – the extent to which one 
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improves one’s chances of finding a job by participating in the policy measure – and 
the duration of the first period of employment. VBP/PAE12 improves chances by 2.5 
per cent for men and 3 per cent for women. Exit from employment during the first 
year is reduced by 37 per cent for men and 24 per cent for women. Exit from 
employment once the person has run through the whole scheme (two years) is at 60 
per cent for men, 14 per cent for women (statistically relevant only for men). 
However, Cockx et al estimate that VBP/PAE12 speeds up entry into a non-
subsidized job for 37 per cent of the men and 32 per cent of the women. The 
analysis for IGU/AGR was limited to women. IGU/AGR increases the chances of 
finding employment, but to a far lesser extent than VBP/PAE12. This leads Cockx et 
al (2004) to conclude that unemployment among less educated employees can be 
explained by a lack of demand rather than a lack of financial incentives. 
 
Marx et al (2009) investigate the working poor in Flanders. They use Eurostat and 
SILC survey data to create a representative sample of Belgian households (family 
types). They then use MISIM (micro simulation – a ‘tax-benefit’ model) to calculate 
how many people fiscal and parafiscal policy (work bonus and tax) actually has an 
impact upon. This report calculates how many people work at the minimum wage, 
how many at the minimum wage+10 per cent, and how many at minimum wage 
+20/30 per cent. Introducing such a minimum wage scale leads to more detailed 
insight into the effects of fiscal policy measures on the working poor. They calculate 
that a rise in the minimum wage (and MW +10/20/30 per cent) of even 30 per cent 
would not have a significant impact on poverty reduction, since most of the working 
poor are working at the bottom of the minimum wage scale and hence gain the least. 
The report also includes a calculation of the effect of the ‘work bonus’, a reduction in 
the employee’s social security contribution, which was introduced in 2008. They 
calculate that those in the middle of the income range gain most and that the 
reduction thus has little effect on poverty. With regard to the minimum wage, Marx et 
al (2009) conclude that parafiscal measures (work bonus and tax reforms) have 
differential impacts depending on family type. A rise in the total minimum wage as a 
standalone measure has little impact on the net income for the working poor, but it 
could help ease the budgetary burden and wage erosion effect of parafiscal 
measures. Moreover, Marx et al (2009) point to a negotiation risk. If policy is focused 
only on parafiscal measures for the lowest wages, this could take away the pressure 
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to negotiate higher minimum wages. In a recent position paper, the Flemish 
employers’ organisation (VOKA 2009) stated that the Belgian minimum wage was 
too high, citing international literature on the issue. Marx et al (2009) argue that high 
minimum wages are an important element in the policy mix. 
 
A third but small research stream on youth unemployment comes from a qualitative 
sociological perspective. Van Hemel and Darquenne (2009) – in a study 
commissioned by the King Baudouain Foundation – documents the experiences and 
strategies of Belgian ‘NEET’-youngsters through interviews with them and focus 
groups with those who offer counselling. It shows that other aspects (social and 
psychological) than the financial one (the minimum wage) work as impediments to 
the transition from school to work. Debts, a lack of clear professional ambition, a bad 
first experience of the labour market (bad job interviews or no response to letters) 
lead to low job motivation. Bad experiences in school cause low motivation for 
vocational training. Lack of child care for very young children and mobility issues set 
these youngsters back when looking for a job. Sanctions, for example losing 
unemployment benefits when refusing to participate in an offered trajectory, are 
perceived as unfair. Van Hemel and Darquenne advise policy makers to allocate 
more resources to job coaching (continuing into employment), revise sanctions (offer 
real choices), design a separate category for single parents and young pregnant 
women with a specific trajectory, and acknowledge short temporary jobs as work 
experience.  
 
 Conclusion 
The Belgian literature focuses on ‘active welfare state’ policies and their impact on 
the unemployment trap, rather than the effect of the minimum wage upon 
employment for young people.  Nevertheless, some results are valuable in drawing 
attention to social and psychological aspects as well as the level of the minimum 
wage as impediments to young people making the transition from school to work.  
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j. Portugal 
 
A monthly minimum wage (salário mínimo nacional, SMN, later renamed retribuição 
mínima mensal garantida, RMMG) was introduced in 1974, following the Portuguese 
revolution. As from 1979, the full rate of the minimum wage was paid to workers age 
20 and over: 18-19 year old workers were paid 75 per cent of the minimum wage: 
15-17 year olds were paid at 50 per cent of the minimum. Rates were and continue 
to be revised annually. From 1977, a lower rate was introduced for agriculture and 
domestic work, but these distinctions were abolished for agriculture in 1991 and for 
domestic work in 2004. From 1 January 1987, the full minimum wage was payable 
from the age of 18, except for apprentices who received 80 per cent of the full rate. A 
rate of 75 per cent of the full minimum wage was paid to 17 year olds; 15-17 year 
olds received 50 per cent.  The rates for those aged 15-17 years rose to 75 per cent 
of the minimum from 1988.  
 
The decision was primarily political in nature, and envisaged as extending full 
citizenship rights to individuals aged 18 and over. The nominal rise in the minimum 
wage for 18-19 year-olds was 49.3 per cent between December 1986 and January 
1987, compared with a nominal increase of 12 per cent for workers aged over 20. 
The real increases were 35.5 per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. This afforded a 
‘natural experiment’ for research. 
As of 2010, the adult minimum wage is €475 a month, an increase of 5.5 per cent 
over the previous year. Recent increases have been substantial, with a proposal to 
raise the rate by c. five per cent each year between 2007 and 2011. As in the 1980s, 
low-wage workers in Portugal are still active in export-oriented manufacturing, and 
this means that minimum wage rises directly impact international competitiveness, 
causing recent concern for employers. However, the bite of the minimum wage has 
declined since the 1980s. 
In 2008, the ratio of the minimum wage to mean earnings was 33 per cent, and to 
median earnings 47 per cent. The OECD average was 37 per cent for mean and 46 
per cent for median earnings (OECD, 2010). The workforce coverage is high, with 
between 260,000-400,000 workers paid at the minimum wage level (depending on 
uprating and the movement of earnings generally).  
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Compulsory education ends at age 14 in Portugal but over four-fifths of those aged 
15 to 19 are in education. The youth unemployment rate was 20 per cent in 2009 
(compared to a total unemployment rate of 10 per cent).  
 
 Literature 
This review looks at two pieces of work that studied different aspects of the impact of 
the ‘natural experiment’ of the 1980s on young people: one deals with employment 
responses in terms of numbers employed and hours worked (Pereira, 2003), the 
other with employment flows and separations (Portugal and Cardoso, 2006). 
 
Pereira (2003) suggests that there has been a negative and lagged impact following 
the large change that took place in 1987, with a range of elasticity of the minimum 
wage to employment of - 0.2 to - 0.4. Lower demand for labour for young people was 
also expressed in a fall in hours worked as well as a relative decline in employment 
numbers. 
 
The lagged response might suggest that firms do not react immediately to large 
changes in the MW. This would appear to challenge other research that asserts that, 
based on typical tenures and business models in low-wage sectors, adjustments are 
very rapid (Neumark suggests a one-year lag). This may be related to employment 
protection and job mobility factors in Portugal, and possibly the existence of military 
service for men: these are not addressed as independent problems in the study. 
Factors related to the speed of adjustment by companies to changes in the MW 
might vary as between the US and Western Europe, where employees tend not be 
employed ‘at will’, where there are longer notice periods and where statutory 
employment protection legislation might limit short-run employer prerogatives on 
dismissal. As such, the lagged response noted by Pereira could have more policy 
relevance for the UK than US estimations based on rapid adjustment.  
 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) noted that teenage employment rose during the study 
period, reflecting the fast pace of overall economic growth. In fact, employment of 
17-19 year-olds rose faster than the average for all age groups, but slower than that 
for 20-23 year olds. (17-19 year-olds up by 4.3 per cent between 1986 and 1987, 
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compared with 3.3 per cent for all age groups and 6.1 per cent for 20-23 year-olds). 
The unemployment rate for 17-19 year-olds fell from 20.2 per cent to 11.6 per cent.  
They note: ‘this evidence is hard to reconcile with the view that minimum wage hikes 
always generate significant employment losses’ when looked at in terms of the 
workforce as a whole’. 
 
In terms of worker flows, the teenage contribution to employment in start-ups fell 
over the period 1986-1989, and the proportion of teenagers employed in firms that 
closed rose. Overall, the proportion of teenagers in all hirings remained constant. 
After the rise in the youth minimum wage, firms reduced the share of teenagers in 
their newly-hired workforce: the share of teenagers was around four per cent lower in 
1988/89 than in 1986. However, the share of teenagers in the total number of 
employees leaving employers (‘separations’) also fell: that is, teenagers were not 
over-represented in this group. The study did not distinguish between resignation 
and redundancy, but the results suggest that the job attachment of teenagers 
previously earning sub-minimum wages rose (explaining lower separations), and this 
also rose more rapidly compared with non-affected workers. Start-ups that began 
activities after the rise in the minimum wage recruited fewer teenagers than start-ups 
that began operations before the rise. Teenagers were also over-represented in 
firms that closed. 
 
The rising rate of employment among young people was ‘driven mainly by a decline 
in job separations’, and the paper conjectures that this could be attributable to ‘firing 
costs’ and ‘sunk hiring costs’. This creates an ‘inaction band’ or period, during which 
a firm will not react to changes in factor prices. However, the hiring of teenagers fell, 
suggesting that where these costs are not present, firms will respond in line with 
classical predictions. 
 
The study suggests, but does not explore in further detail, the possibility that 
employment protection arrangements could offer an opportunity for less-skilled 
young people to shelter in companies for a period, should the rise in the minimum 
wage threaten their ability to find employment. One implication of this – unstated in 
the study – may be that educational enrolment might rise for some skilled young 
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people held back from entering the labour market by less-skilled incumbents, and 
also for some less-skilled young people who have not yet been hired. 
 
In a further piece of work, that in part builds on Portugal and Cardoso (2006) 
Cardoso (2009), explores the impact on employees subsequent earnings of 
exposure to minimum wages as young people. The study is based on a dataset that 
allows individual workers to be tracked over time. Workers were tracked from 1987 
to 2005. Two broad hypotheses are investigated:  
 
i) in line with human capital theory (Becker, 1964) that minimum wages will 
reduce employer incentives to train, and that exposed employees would 
subsequently exhibit a flatter earnings profile;  
ii) in line with Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) that, given a range of labour 
market frictions, and in particular the scope to extract higher rents from 
skilled employees, and given incentives by firms to follow a job upgrading 
strategy through training in the presence of a minimum wage, exposed 
workers might have a subsequent wage premium or steeper experience-
earnings profile. 
 
Two other theoretical mechanisms linking minimum wages to human capital 
formation are expressly rejected: firstly, that minimum wages might have an impact 
on schooling: no impact is assumed as the general trend towards an increase in the 
level of schooling means that younger cohorts (i.e. those more affected by high 
youth minimum wages) will have higher schooling levels and no causal link can be 
established between this and the minimum wage; secondly, the ‘employment 
channel’ is also rejected as a means of influencing the wage profile of workers 
exposed to the MW as young people, on the grounds that, specifically for Portugal, 
Portugal and Cardoso (2006) did not find a detrimental impact on employment. 
 
Cardoso (2009) concludes that, in the light of the absence of employment effects 
and the bite and spillover effects found within the overall group of young people, 
employers looked for compensating mechanisms to accommodate the increases in 
the minimum wage: 
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i) ‘actual exposure to high youth minimum wages can have a positive impact 
on longer-term wages’, with the increases in future wages of between 5 
per cent and 13 per cent, depending on the length of exposure (for data 
where workers remain with the employer and who have been observed 
from early in their careers as a more precise means of assessing the 
impact of firm-specific training). This is consistent with labour market 
imperfection theories. 
ii) A flatter tenure-earnings profile, the longer the exposure to the MW: this is 
consistent with human capital models, at first sight (see immediately 
below).  
 
Cardoso (2009) argues that both results are consistent with Portugal and Cardoso 
(2006) in that increased job attachment by young workers on minimum wages might 
raise their productivity through work experience (but not ‘explicitly costly training 
provided by the firm’), and that job attachment of such workers would allow firms to 
flatten the tenure-earnings profile.25 This, Cardoso argues, could be a simple 
consequence of higher wages when young, with firms compensating for higher initial 
wages with slower wage progression. 
 
 Conclusion 
Pereira’s research is broadly in line with other findings using these approaches, 
although Portugal and Cardoso (2006) are very critical of the dataset used. The 
policy implication might be that a ‘minimum wage shock’, such as that induced by 
altering the applicability of rates, not only has a negative effect (albeit not a very 
large one, given the high bite of the minimum wage in Portugal) but will take some 
time to work through the system. This might apply in particular in European as 
opposed to US contexts, as European employment protection legislation arguably 
generally inhibits rapid headcount adjustment. Although counterposing their work in 
some ways to Pereira and Neumark & Wascher, the study by Portugal and Cardoso 
                                               
25
 As Cardoso (2009) notes, Card and Krueger (1995:170) discuss the relationship between the 
minimum wage and shirking in this context. 
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(2006) broadly supports this position, as the lower rate of separations - however 
understood - of young workers could be interpreted as a limit on adjustment. 
However, there are many caveats to this argument, which requires much more 
contextual and qualitative research on enrolment decisions, structures of education 
and vocational training and associated incentives (returns to training etc.), and the 
impact of employment protection. 
 
Finally, Cardoso (2009) argues that tests of models hypothesizing particular types of 
firm response to minimum wages for young people do not yield unambiguous results, 
with both wage premiums (consistent with Acemoglu and Pischke) and flatter tenure-
earnings profiles (consistent with human capital models). She suggests that a ‘more 
comprehensive model of human capital investment by firms following an increase in 
the minimum wage may be called for’ (Cardoso 2009). 
 
k. The Netherlands 
 
National minimum wage regulations have existed in the Netherlands since World 
War 2 but the current system dates from 1968. In the post-war period all collective 
bargaining had to be approved by government under an Exceptional Directive on 
Industrial Relations, which governed collective bargaining for a longer period of time 
than anticipated when it was introduced in 1945 (Windmuller et al, 1979). It was only 
after the Foundation of Labour gradually developed into a major institution of social 
policy, representing employers and trade unions, and the Social Economic Council 
(SER – Sociaal Economische Raad), introduced in 1950 with a consultancy duty 
regarding legislation by the government, that the famous ‘Poldermodel’  came to 
govern industrial relations and labour market development in the Netherlands. This 
model of policy making is based on intensive interaction and dialogue between 
employers, trade unions and independent experts (in the SER), by which the 
interests of various parties are traded off. Policy regarding low paid work and the 
minimum wage was shaped accordingly. 
 
In the period of centralised wage setting the level of minimum-wage income was 
explicitly designed to meet the needs of a full-time, unskilled breadwinner and his 
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family (SEC 1997). With the increasing involvement of the social partners and their 
institutions in policy making and wage setting, the initiative for the introduction of a 
minimum wage came from the social partners, who agreed an economy wide 
minimum wage – 100 guilders a week – in 1964, still based on the needs of the 
breadwinner as the earner of a family income. Shortly afterwards, in 1968, a 
statutory minimum wage was established by law (Salverda et al, 2008). The 
minimum wage (143 guilders and 50 cents) was applicable to anyone aged twenty 
four years or above. Although the level of this minimum wage was set on the basis of 
the bread winners’ needs, it was the same for every employee, regardless of their 
position in a household. In 1970 the threshold for entitlement was lowered to age 23.  
 
In 1974 the minimum wage for young workers was introduced with a separate level 
of pay for each year from the age of 15 onwards. The minimum wage for youths is 
expressed as a fraction of the adult rate, rising from 30 per cent at age 15 to 85 per 
cent at age 22. The adult rate applies from age 23. 
 
In the Netherlands young people are obliged to follow some kind of education until 
the age of 18. From the age of 15 until 18 employment can only be part-time, hence 
the minimum wage only applies to a maximum of three days a week. Youth minimum 
wages are defined as fractions of minimum wages for adults, starting at 30 per cent 
of the adult wage for 15 years olds (Salverda 2008). The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment presents three arguments for this lower youth minimum wage 
(SZW, 2010): young workers are less trained and experienced; their needs are less 
than those of adults; high earnings would make work relatively more attractive 
compared to education. Youth unemployment in 2009 stood at 7.3 per cent, much 
lower than most of the other European countries considered in this review. Almost 91 
per cent of those aged 15 to 19 are in education as are over half of those aged 20 to 
24 (the highest proportion of the European countries considered). 
 
Since the introduction of youth minimum wages the debate around the legitimacy 
and efficiency of separate minimum wages for youngsters has continued. Trade 
unions are in favour of lowering the age for the adult minimum wage to 21 or 18, 
whereas in the political debate some would support the increase of the youth 
minimum wage to age 27. 
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Wages – including those of low paid employees - are not set in the first place by the 
statutory minimum wage, but for a considerable number of employees by the lowest 
threshold of wages in collective agreements. In the Netherlands, with a coverage 
rate of about 75 per cent, the wage of most employees is set by collective 
agreements. The Minister has the right to extend the collective agreement for the 
sector for which the agreement is negotiated.  
 
 Literature 
Dolado et al (1996) indicate that studies of the impact of the minimum wage in the 
Netherlands are complicated by two factors. First, around three-quarters of the 
workforce are covered by sectoral collective agreements that also set minimum 
rates. These are typically higher than the legal minimum with the gap being larger for 
younger workers. This ‘means that the gap between the youth and adult minimum 
may not be as large as the legal minimum might suggest’ (Dolado et al, 1996).  
However, as most of the sectoral agreements followed the reduction in the youth 
minimum in 1981 and 1984 and nominal minimum wages in 1984, the time series 
and cross-sectional variation in minimum wages was not really affected by the 
sectoral agreements.  Secondly, it should be noted that unemployment benefits are 
directly linked to the minimum wage, so all changes in the minimum wage are 
reflected in benefit levels as well. This clearly creates problems in disentangling the 
effects of benefit changes from minimum wages.   
 
Studies on the impact of the level of minimum wages on employment do not, 
however, show clear evidence. Van Soest (1989, 1994) and Koning et al (1995) 
claim to find very negative effects of minimum wages, but do so using data in which 
there is effectively no variation in minimum wages (Dolado et al, 1996).  Van Soest 
(1994) analyses the impact of the youth minimum wage on both employment and 
unemployment of youngsters compared with overall figures for all employees. One of 
the hypotheses is that employers would employ more (young) employees because of 
lower labour costs with a low minimum wage. This could mean a growth of 
employment or substitution of older workers by young employees. The study finds, 
however, no clear evidence for an impact of lowering of the minimum wage on 
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employment and unemployment levels. It concludes that it is not clear whether 
employment has improved or whether substitution effects have taken place.  
 
Dolado et al (1996) looked at the change in youth rates relative to adult rates in 1981 
and 1983. The fraction of the adult minimum received by 20 year olds was reduced 
from 77.5 per cent to 61.5 per cent and for 16 year olds from 47.5 per cent to 34.5 
per cent. While wages for those aged 23 or more increased by nine per cent from 
1980 to 1984, the wage for those aged under 23 actually fell, with the youngest 
workers having the largest fall. However, in terms of employment the share of youth 
employment fell from 19.4 per cent in 1979 to 16.4 per cent in 1985.  
 
Dolado et al (1996) also consider this effect on the nine occupations where young 
workers are most commonly found. They found that while the youth share of total 
employment in the whole economy fell over this period, there was a slight increase 
for two groups – agricultural labour and leather and textile workers. This might 
suggest that the cut in youth minimum wages did increase the relative employment 
of young workers in those parts of the economy most likely to be affected although 
these differences were at best ‘on the margins of statistical significance’ (Dolado et 
al 1996). Most of the sectors showed a decline in the youth employment share.  
 
The Labour Inspectorate found that an overwhelming majority of companies did not 
use the new, low, collectively-bargained scales and only 6 per cent of employees 
had a wage at these levels (Ackerman and Klaassen, 1998 in Salverda 2008). It is 
therefore fair to state that the effects of the changing nature of the minimum wage on 
actual jobs and employment levels are likely to be limited. 
 
 Conclusion 
The difficulties in measuring the impact of the minimum wage on employment in the 
Netherlands, noted above, must be taken strongly into account in assessing the 
impact of minimum wages.  In most low-paying sectors MWs appear to have 
reduced employment slightly although slight increases in employment were also 
found in some.    
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l. Finland 
 
 Context 
Finland, in common with some other countries such as Denmark, is normally 
described as not having a statutory minimum wage.  However, since the 1970s, 
minimum wages have been based on collective agreements concluded in most 
sectors between employers’ federations and trade unions.  These agreements 
stipulate minimum wages and the coverage of this system has been extensive, since 
an erga omnes or ‘extension’ arrangement exists in most agreements whereby the 
agreements are binding on employers in a given sector whether those employers are 
members of the employers’ federation or not.  According to Statistics Finland, the 
level of minimum wages has been about half of the average earnings of employees 
in each sector.  Progressive taxation tends to reduce the differential between 
minimum and median wages in each sector: at the minimum wage level, taxation is 
around 12 per cent; at average earnings levels, it is about 18 per cent.  
 
There are employees who are not covered by collective agreements (around 5 per 
cent) for different reasons. If there is no collective agreement, then industrial 
inspectors who normally cover safety issues monitor compliance with other 
arrangements. These are that where the social partners have made 
recommendations, they are adopted as the basis for fixing a minimum wage. In all 
cases, even where no such recommendations exist, a full-time employee should be 
paid at least those wages that would give him or her the right to unemployment 
insurance. This would currently mean a wage of around €1,000 per month. Thus, 
there are in fact legally and normatively-sanctioned ‘safety net’ arrangements that 
operate to ensure full coverage where collective agreements fail to do so.   
 
The minimum wage has only been an issue in Finland recently to the extent that 
foreign sub-contractors have on occasions not paid it.  This has caused strikes to 
occur in construction companies and in fact the issue has been a principal cause of 
strikes in Finland in recent years.  Therefore the only contentious issue has been 
compliance by ‘outsiders’.  
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Youth unemployment in Finland in 2009 stood at 21.6 per cent, compared to a total 
unemployment rate of 8.4 per cent. Over 90 per cent of those aged 15 to 19 years 
old are in education as are over half of those aged 20 to 24. 
 
 Literature 
The one available paper on our subject concerning Finland is Böckerman and 
Uusitalo (2009). This paper looks at youth minimum wages and employment in the 
retail sector. It follows up on previous work that found no negative employment 
effects from the minimum wage carried out earlier by Sauramo and Solttila (1985) 
and Saari (1996). It studies the effects on youth employment of the temporary 
Finnish policy between 1993 and 1995 of allowing employers to pay workers under 
25 below the agreed minimum rates, within the retail sector. It used employers’ data. 
The main findings are that although some employers did take advantage of the 
possibility of paying below the MW, the majority did not, fearing that this would have 
a negative effect on effort. There was no employment effect, i.e. the temporary policy 
did not boost employment among the young worker group that it was intended to 
benefit. In fact, there was a very small positive employment effect on the group 
whose wages were not reduced. 
 
 Conclusion 
The small but rigorous literature on Finland provides no support for an argument that 
employers look to reduce minimum wages when given the opportunity, and that 
other factors such as motivation and retention are relevant to their decision-making 
process opportunity.   
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CHAPTER 4: OVERALL CONCLUSION 
 
Our review was conducted by a sizeable team of specialist reviewers that included 
country experts external to the review team. Over sixty papers were reviewed, with 
over a third of these coming from North America. Striking lacunae exist in the current 
work on the employment effects of minimum wages internationally. For example, 
there is a clear need for more qualitative work on employer views both of employing 
young people on the minimum wage and on training young workers, in order to shed 
more light on the mechanisms at work.  
 
The concerns of academics in the different countries facing the issues discussed 
here vary considerably. In many CMEs, the issues have had a low or very low public 
profile. The literature from LMEs appears most useful for UK policy purposes both 
because of its focus on the issue and because of the institutional similarities. By far 
the greatest volume of high quality literature on our issues has been generated by 
US-based academics, although even in that country coverage of the issues is 
patchy.   
 
The review covers the three main policy concerns relating to the Minimum Wage, viz: 
1) that the minimum wage may lead to the displacement of younger by older 
workers, 2) that the minimum wage may, if set too high, act as a disincentive to 
young people to invest in their educational opportunities and to enter the labour 
market instead; and 3) the minimum wage may affect the provision of training for 
young workers, positively or negatively, either because they become a more 
expensive resource and hence more valuable or because their costs deter 
employers from training them.   
 
The size of employment effects from the introduction of a minimum wage, or of 
increases in existing minimum wages for young people in general are extremely 
small and on the margins of statistical significance in the great majority of studies 
surveyed. The employment elasticity for 16-17 year-olds in 2003 in Hyslop and 
Stillman (2007), in the New Zealand study was -0.1 to -0.2, a typical result for those 
studies arguing that a significant effect exists. There is some evidence that negative 
employment effects, where they exist, may disappear as the worker ages. The 
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disemployment effects of minimum wages remain hotly disputed in many countries, 
but are in any event very small, and even non-existent, when subjected to sensitive 
econometric analysis. In some cases, employment is increased by the existence of a 
minimum wage. Once issues of seasonality, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
are addressed and the longer the time available in the data, the smaller the impact of 
the minimum wage on employment becomes. 
 
The impact of minimum wages upon the youth labour market is more likely to be 
negative where there is no separate subminimum (minima) for younger workers as 
for example in Spain.  
 
There is some evidence that the very small employment impacts can be mitigated 
and in some cases be positive if the subminimum rate is set at the appropriate level. 
The prudent approach taken by the UK LPC might be seen as helpful in mitigating 
the effect of youth minimum wages on employment. There is evidence that increases 
in 16-17 year old rates do have some negative effect on the extent of their 
employment, as shown for example in the New Zealand study by Hyslop and 
Stillman (2007).  
 
Where wide support exists in society for minimum wages, employers rarely take 
advantage of suspensions of minimum wages for younger workers even when given 
the opportunity to do so, as shown in the case of Finland where employers did not 
take advantage of a temporary minimum wage suspension to reduce young workers 
pay (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2009).   
 
The method by which the minimum wage is set is relevant, with systems which set 
rates by collective bargaining less likely to experience negative employment effects.  
Minimum wages for young people may also have a less negative or indeed nil impact 
where there are strong labour market interventions by Government to support 
employment for young workers.    
 
There is only a relatively small literature on effects on schooling. In the UK and the 
USA, there is very little evidence that minimum wages for 16-17 year olds have 
exerted a negative influence on continued school participation. The legal school 
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minimum leaving age is an important determinant of continued participation.  
Schooling effects appear to be as dependent on school leaving ages and other 
factors conditioning individual decisions as on minimum wages.    
 
Effects on employer training are less studied than the other topics. There are 
contradictory estimates of the effect of minimum wages on training, partly because 
effects are very small.  
 
The overall findings of our review are that the impact of minimum wages upon the 
youth labour market is more likely to be negative where there is no separate 
subminimum(s) for younger workers. The effect appears to vary across social groups 
and not simply across age bands.   
 
The method by which the minimum wage is set also appears to have an effect, with 
systems which set rates by collective bargaining less likely to experience negative 
effects. This is partly explained by the fact that, under collective bargaining, 
outcomes are more likely to be linked to the current state of the labour market, in 
comparison to systems which have more rigid links to economic indicators. Minimum 
wages for young people may also have a less negative or indeed non-existent 
impact where there are strong labour market interventions by Government to support 
employment for young workers.    
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
 
 By Dr Denise Hawkes 
  
Econometric Techniques for Estimating the Effect of the Minimum Wage on 
Employment 
 
This literature review has highlighted many econometrics papers that have 
attempted to quantify the impact of the minimum wage on youth employment and 
employment of the low paid.  Regardless of the method, the aim of the papers was 
empirically to test the following theoretical model: 
 
Employment = f(Minimum Wage, Other Covariates of Interest) 
 
The model has been quantified using three main approaches based on the type of 
data available: time series, repeated cross sectional data or panel data.  The key 
characteristics of the data that determine the method used to estimate are the 
primary sampling unit used: aggregate data (regional, national) or individual data and 
the length of time for which the data is available (2 periods or more).  This technical 
appendix will highlight these three main estimation approaches and briefly discuss 
their usefulness. 
 
 Aggregate Data – Time Series Estimation 
The use of aggregate data to consider this question will enable the researcher to 
consider the impact of the minimum wage on the employment rate in the economy 
over time.  Therefore if the focus of the piece of work is on the overall 
regional/national rate of employment, this data can provide useful insights.  It cannot 
however tell us about the individual decisions of the people within the labour market 
in relation to the introduction or change in the minimum wage.  With aggregate data, 
time series methods are used to consider the effect of the minimum wage by 
collecting data before and after the introduction/change in the minimum wage rate.  
These methods involve estimating the following models: 
 
Et = a + b MWt + c Xt + ut 
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Where t is the time period in which the variables are observed, E is employment rate, 
MW is the minimum wage, X is other covariates of interest and u is the error term.  
This model can also include lagged variables of the independent variables if there is 
believed to have been a time lag in their impact on the employment rate. 
 
Interestingly it is clear from the review that once issues of seasonality, serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity are addressed the longer the time available in the 
data the smaller the impact of the minimum wage on employment.  This approach 
therefore is useful in seeing the longer term impacts of minimum wage legislation on 
the labour force as a whole.  The weakness of this approach is that it cannot tell us 
in detail about the types of workers most affected by minimum wage legislation.  For 
that we need to consider individual level data. 
 
 Individual Data – Repeated Cross Section 
The use of repeated cross sectional data enables the researcher to consider the 
immediate impact of the minimum wage on employment in the economy.  Whilst the 
data collected is often based on individual surveys, the analysis must focus on the 
average effects on the sample as the same individuals are not necessarily 
interviewed at both time periods.  Like the time series data therefore the focus of the 
piece of work is on the overall or average effect on the rate of employment.  With 
repeated cross section, a difference-in-differences approach is used to consider the 
effect of the minimum wage by collecting data before and after the 
introduction/change in the minimum wage rate.  In a two period model across two 
groups of works, covered by and not covered by the minimum wage, the following 
model would be estimated: 
 
E
 
= a + bMW + cZ + dMW.Z + eX + u 
 
Where E is the employment rate, MW is the minimum wage rate, Z is a dummy for 
covered by the minimum wage and MW.Z is the interaction term between minimum 
wage and being covered by it, the X is other covariates of interest and u is the error 
term.  
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These models are often estimated in the form of a natural experiment where the 
policy change was introduced in a pilot in the first instance for example.  Of course 
the validity of the model depends on our belief in the separateness of the control and 
treatment groups.  This approach is good for the analysis of the immediate effects of 
the minimum wage policy if the natural experiment is considered truly exogenous.  
The weakness of the approach is that it cannot tell us in detail about the individual 
workers decisions in response to a change in minimum wage legislation.  For that we 
need to consider panel data. 
 
 Individual Data – Panel Data 
The use of panel data would enable the researcher to track the same workers 
through time and see how their behaviour or labour market experience changed in 
response to the change in the minimum wage.  It can therefore provide a focused 
look for the youth employment effect in terms of the movement between 
employment, education and inactivity.  These methods involve estimating the 
following models: 
 
Eit = a + b MWit + c Xit + uit 
 
Where t is the time period in which the variables are observed and i is the individual 
for which data has been collected, E is employment rate, MW is the minimum wage, 
X is other covariates of interest and u is the error term. 
 
These models would largely be estimated with fixed effects estimation, although 
some may use random effects models. The validity of the fixed effects results 
depends on the assumption that the unobserved characteristics are constant over 
time within an individual.  Any time-varying unobservable has the usual omitted 
variable bias effect. 
 
In conclusion, the research objective and the type of data available jointly determine 
whether a short-run or long-run estimate was found and whether the focus was on 
the labour market as a whole or on the individual workers experience in response to 
a change in the minimum wage.
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APPENDIX: Table 2 Tabular Summary of Results from Key Literature 
Country Study Aim of Research Sample Size(s) Time Period(s) Employment effects of 
MW; Elasticities 
Training effects 
of MW 
Schooling 
effects of MW 
USA Acemoglu and 
Pischke 2001 
Academic research. 
This paper looks at 
the effect of the 
minimum wage on 
training provision. 
The NLSY is a panel of 
youths and 
oversamples those 
from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. It 
contains a relatively 
high number of low 
wage workers directly 
affected by MW 
increases. However, 
the sample period used 
excludes very young 
workers. The NLSY is a 
panel of youths aged 
14 to 21 in 1979 but the 
analysis follow the 
cohorts from 1987-1992 
(so the workers will be 
22-27 years old). 
1987-1992 
 
 No significant 
effect of MW on 
training. Workers 
starting a new job 
are more likely to 
receive training. 
 
 
USA Bazen and 
Marimoutou 
2002 
Economic research. 
This paper looks at 
employment effects of 
teenage minimum 
wage. 
 
The data source used 
is taken from Card and 
Krueger (1995). This, in 
turn, was an update of 
the data used in 
Wellington (1991) 
which is taken from the 
Bureau of Labour 
Statistics and the 
Current Population 
Report. 
Different sample 
lengths are used: 
1954:1 – 1979:4 
(quarterly data). 
1954:1 – 1989:4 
1954:1 – 1999:2 
 
Negative impact: when 
the MW increases by 1% 
in real terms, the teenage 
employment rate will fall 
by 0.1% in the same 
quarter; but in the long-
run the effect increases 
to 0.2%. 
  
USA Chaplin and 
Turner 2003 
The paper intends to 
extend the evidence 
on the impact of MW 
on school enrolment 
by controlling for 
ethnic background, 
urban status and 
The data are not very 
large compared to other 
source (CPS) but the 
information on 
enrolment is more 
accurate so overall this 
is a good data set. The 
Panel data analysis 
covering the 
following period: 
1989-1996 
 
  Negative effect: 
a $1 increase in 
MW lowers the 
continuation ratio 
by approximately 
1%. The 
interaction terms 
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different compulsory 
schooling laws in 
different states.  
 
specifications include a 
large number of 
controls to account for 
different factors that 
might affect 
continuation ratios. 
between the MW 
and the different 
dropout ages 
show that the 
MW has a 
negative and 
significant effect 
in those states 
where the 
dropout age is 
16 or less. 
USA Currie and 
Fallick 1996 
Academic research. 
This paper considers 
the effect of the 
minimum wage on 
employment. 
 
Looks at effects of 
increases in the 
Federal minimum wage 
between 1980 and 
1981. Large sample of 
young people followed 
through time with 
extensive labour market 
data. 
 
1979-1987 
 
Negative effect: 
increasing the federal 
MW in 1979/1980 
reduced youth 
employment by about 3% 
a year afterwards. 
Estimated elasticities -
0.19 to -0.24; significant. 
  
USA Farris and 
Pedace 2004 
The paper analysis 
the impact of MW on 
job training using an 
Employer Survey 
rather than the worker 
Surveys used in 
previous work. This 
allows a better 
evaluation of the 
determinants of 
training, which is 
ultimately offered by 
the firm. The paper 
aims at addressing 
the issue of poor 
measurement of on–
the-job-training as 
well as controlling for 
establishment-level 
characteristics that 
can affect training. 
 
The sample size is 
fairly large (cross 
section of 1098 
observations).  The 
NES provides detailed 
information about hours 
of training and 
percentage of worker 
training. 
The analysis covers 
one year: 1997 
 
 
Negative impact 
of MW on the 
percentage of 
workers trained. 
No significant 
impact of MW on 
average hours of 
training. 
 
Effect of MW on 
average hours of 
training: 
Front line:  0.2407 
(13.1012) 
Support staff:  -
4.7185 (9.8664) 
Technical: 8.7051 
(14.1721) 
Supervisory: -
1.4752 (9.3511) 
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USA Neumark and 
Wascher 2001 
Academic research.  
It aims at re-
assessing the 
relationship between 
the MW and training 
using employee data. 
This is a cross sectional 
analysis with some time 
dimension introduced in 
the construction of the 
MW variable 
(percentage by which 
the state minimum 
exceeded the federal 
minimum over the 
previous 3 years) and 
in the use of a control 
group for the year 
1983. The descriptive 
analysis is very detailed 
and shows interesting 
differences among the 
different age groups. 
Cross section 
analysis for 1991 
 Impact of MW on 
on-the-job 
training: MW 
reduces the 
incidence of on-
the-job training 
among 16-24 and 
20-24 year olds at 
the 10% level. 
Negative effect for 
the group 16-19 
years old but not 
statistically 
significant.   
Impact of MW on 
training to qualify 
for the current job: 
no significant 
positive effects. 
Some significant 
negative effects 
on the 20-24 
years old; positive 
and significant 
effect of MW on in 
school training for 
the 16-19 age 
group. They find 
no incidence of 
MW on informal 
training while 
there is a negative 
effect of MW on 
formal training for 
the 20-24 years 
old. The effect on 
the 16-24 years 
old is not 
statistically 
significant. 
 
USA Neumark and 
Wascher 1995 
Academic Research. 
Examines effect on 
teenagers at Federal 
The sample is limited to 
individuals who were 
between 16 and 19 in 
1979-1992 .  A higher MW 
increases the 
demand for 
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and State levels. 
 
the first year of the 
matched records so it is 
particularly suitable for 
the analysis. The CPS 
permits a match of 
some individuals for the 
same months across 
two consecutive years. 
The records include 
employment and 
enrolment status. The 
former is taken from the 
employment status 
recode, while the latter 
is deduced from the 
major activity in the 
survey week. The 
authors use a 
multinomial logit model 
which is suitable to 
capture changes in the 
probabilities of different 
activities, with respect 
to the MW variable. 
enrolled (higher 
educated) 
teenagers. 
Workers leaving 
school and 
queuing up for 
jobs when MW 
increases. 
 
USA Neumark and 
Washer 2003 
The publication aims 
at providing additional 
evidence on the 
relationship between 
schooling and MW. It 
also intends to 
address the criticism 
by Evans and Turner 
(1995) by using a 
correctly measured 
MW variable and to 
present more up-to-
date evidence. 
The sample size and 
the methodology are 
correct. However, apart 
from the unemployment 
rate, there are not 
many controls for other 
characteristics of the 
labour force. 
1978-1989 
1980-1998 – 
updated estimates 
 
Positive and significant 
impact of MW on the 
proportion of workers 
employed but not on 
those enrolled, i.e. it 
‘sucks’ young people out 
of school.  
 
 MW has a 
significant and 
negative effect 
on enrolment 
rates. 
USA Park and Ratti 
1998 
Considers the effects 
of MW on teenage 
employment. 
The issue of non 
stationarity is certainly 
important when 
analysing time series 
data. The authors carry 
out unit roots test and 
1954:1 – 1992:2 In the regressions the 
impact of the MW on 
teenage employment is 
negative and statistically 
significant in most 
specifications and its 
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show that all series but 
the DV are non 
stationary in levels. 
Therefore the 
methodology used for 
the estimation (taking 
first differences of the 
non-stationary 
variables) is 
appropriate. However, 
the authors should 
have maybe looked at 
different dynamic 
models. 
effect ranges from -0.75 
to -1.04 (linear model) 
and from -0.67 to -0.96 
(log model). But NB the 
problem of spurious 
regression noted in text.  
USA Schiller 1994 Economic 
research/policy 
research. Considers 
the impact of MW on 
training. 
 
The analysis is based 
on a large sample of 
workers followed over 
the years 1979-1987. 
The age of the workers 
ranges between 14-22 
at the beginning of the 
sample and 22-30 at 
the end of the sample. 
The survey contains 
specific questions on 
training. The data set is 
particularly suitable for 
analysis of MW effects 
on youths.  
Methodology is based 
on Logit (training 
equation) and standard 
OLS (wage growth 
equation).  
 
1979-1987 
 
 Analysis suggests 
a negative effect 
of MW on training; 
however, workers 
on the MW at 
entry do not 
perceive 
themselves to be 
at a disadvantage. 
A large majority of 
young workers do 
not feel trapped in 
low wage jobs 
with low training 
opportunities; they 
feel that they are 
gaining valuable 
experience, and 
they have 
chances for 
promotion.  
 
USA Turner and 
Demiralp 2001 
The paper analyses 
the joint impact of 
MW on teenagers’ 
school enrolment and 
employment.  The 
paper particularly 
refers to the proposed 
increase in the 
Looks at effect of 
minimum wage on 
school enrolment. The 
main advantage of the 
survey used is that it 
attempts to follow teens 
if they move out of their 
parents’ household. 
1991 and 1992 
 
Considers Federal MW 
increase in 1991. 
Multinomial logit analysis. 
Positive impact on 
idleness: MW hike 
significantly decreases 
the probability of 
becoming idle (not 
 Negative impact 
on school 
enrolment 
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federal MW from 
$5.15 to $6.15 per 
hour and attempts at 
evaluating the 
possible outcomes, 
following this MW 
hike. 
The initial number of 
youth aged 16 to 19 are 
interviewed first in 1991 
and then again in the 
following year (17 to 20 
years old).  Taking into 
account this time 
dimension is very 
important and teens’ 
employment/education 
status tend to change 
quite often. 
enrolled and not 
employed).  Therefore 
some positive effects on 
employment and 
enrolment.  
 
USA Williams and 
Mills 2001 
Economic research.  
The authors address 
three specification 
issues related to time 
series analysis: 
1)Stationarity of the 
variables 
2) Dynamic 
specification 
3)Endogeneity 
The authors present a 
very detailed time 
series analysis. This is 
very useful to 
understand the impact 
of MW on teenage 
employment using 
national data. 
1954:1 –1993:4  
(quarterly data) 
 
Analyse data from Card 
and Krueger (1995). 
Negative effect, highest 
after 2 years (-4.5%); 
effects disappear after 4 
years.  10% rise in MW 
brings immediate 0.6% 
negative effect on 
employment, 1.6% after 
one additional quarter; 
1.20% after one year.  
  
Canada Landon 1997 Academic research. 
This paper examines 
the link between the 
minimum wage and 
drop- out rates from 
education. 
The sample is robust. 
Furthermore, the author 
is at pains to 
demonstrate that it has 
been used in a way that 
makes up for the short-
comings of previous 
research. 
1975-1989   Negative effect: 
greater the MW, 
the more likely 
the drop-out.  
 
Canada Baker et al 
1999 
Looks at impact of 
minimum wage, 
especially among 
young workers. 
Looks at teenagers (15-
19) across Canadian 
provinces and over 
time. Tabulations 
commissioned from 
Statistics Canada. 
1979-1993 Finds negative significant 
minimum wage elasticity 
for teenagers of around -
0.25. Effect on teenage 
employment varies 
across the bandwidth. At 
low frequencies 
corresponding to cycles 
of around six years or 
more, elasticity is at the 
upper end of the range 
identified in previous 
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studies. Elasticities: 
Within group 0.27, 1st 
difference 0.07, 2nd 
difference - 0.13, 3rd 
difference - 0.31, 4th 
difference - 040. Within-
group estimates and 
longer-difference 
estimates significant.  
Canada Campolieti et 
al 2005a 
Analysis of how 
minimum wages 
affect various 
schooling-
employment 
outcomes. 
Looks at teenagers 
across provinces and 
over time. Multinomial 
logit analysis. Data 
from Survey of Labour 
and Income Dynamics.  
1993-1999 Finds that minimum wage 
increases led to large 
and statistically 
significant reductions in 
the employment of 
teenagers. Non-
employed and enrolled 
0.72 
Employed and enrolled -
0.57 
Employed and not 
enrolled -1.92 
Idle 0.02 
Net employment – 2.49 
(significant). Net school 
enrolment 0.15; not 
significant. 
 No net effect on 
school enrolment 
or on the 
individual 
transition 
probabilities. 
No substantial 
substitution of 
students for non-
students or 
students leaving 
school to queue 
for the higher 
minimum wage 
jobs.  
Canada Campolieti et 
al 2005b 
Compares transitions 
from employment to 
non-employment for 
individuals affected 
by minimum wage 
changes with 
comparator groups 
not affected by 
minimum wages. 
Looks at 16-24 year 
olds across provinces 
and over time. Data 
from Survey of Labour 
and Income Dynamics.  
1993-1999 Results indicate that 
minimum wage increases 
have increased the 
transition from 
employment to non-
employment of employed 
low-wage youths by 
around 6 percentage 
points (range 4-8 per 
cent).  
Elasticities: - 0.3 to - 0.5. 
 
  
Canada Campolieti et 
al 2006 
Reproduces Neumark 
(2001) methodology 
of a pre-specified 
research design to 
examine impact of 
Looks at 16-19, 20-24 
and 16-24 groups, 
including full-time 
versus part-time and 
non-enrolled.  Across 
1981-1997 Minimum wage 
elasticities substantial:  
16-19 years: – 0.17 to 
0.44; 20-24 years: - 0.14 
to - 0.43. 16-24 years: - 
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minimum wage.   provinces and over 
time. Data from April 
Labour Force Surveys. 
0.17 to – 0.44. 
 
Canada Yuen 2003 Considers the impact 
of increases in the 
minimum wage on 
youth unemployment.  
Looks at 16-19 and 20-
24 year olds across 
provinces and over 
time. The data is drawn 
from a relatively short 
period of time and this 
may be a limitation (cf. 
other more longitudinal 
studies on similar 
subject matter). 
However, the 
stratification of the 
sample into ‘transitory’ 
and ‘permanent’ low 
wage workers is useful 
and innovative in 
understanding the 
behaviour of the labour 
market in question. 
1988-1990, annual Negative effect: an 
increase in the MW is 
very likely to lead to a 
reduction in the overall 
youth employment level. 
Permanent low-wage 16-
19 workers - 0.86 
(significant). Permanent 
low-wage young adult 20-
24 workers – 1.15 
(significant). Transitory 
teens and young adult 
workers insignificant 
effect. 
  
Canada Edagbami 
2006 
Considers the effect 
of MW upon teenage 
and youth 
unemployment. 
Meta analysis of 
various studies looking 
at impact of minimum 
wage not just of youths 
and teenagers but more 
general effects. 
Concentrates on 
studies produced 
from the mid-1980s 
to 2006. 
 
Meta analysis of 
studies using 
varying approaches, 
although considers 
primarily studies 
that have used 
labour force panel 
data 
MW is generally harmful 
to teenage and youth 
unemployment.  
Elasticities vary 
according to study under 
review and are 
considered in comparison 
in the meta analysis 
  
Canada McDonald and 
Myatt 2004 
Considers impact of 
MW on youth 
employment. 
Looks at ‘teenagers’; 
longitudinal study using 
labour force panel data 
Mid-1970s- 2004 
Annual labour force 
panel data by 
province. 
Negative effect.  
Elasticities = 
-0.259 (1976-1993) but 
increasing to -0.326 
when considered over a 
longer time period (1976-
2002) 
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Canada Swidinsky 
1980 
Considers impact of 
MW on employment 
of females and young 
people. 
Uses annual labour 
force panel data, 
considers different 
aspects of the labour 
market but draws 
specific conclusions on 
effects on ‘youth’ labour 
market (as well as 
women). 
1956-1975, Annual 
labour force panel 
data by province 
Female employment is 
far more sensitive to MW 
changes than male 
employment; for youths 
the tendency is reversed.  
 
  
Australia Leigh 2003 The aim of the study 
is academic research 
with a policy impact, 
in particular to 
develop ‘indigenous’ 
regression estimates 
and elasticities for 
Australia. 
Direct data on MW 
coverage and 
microdata on 
employment were not 
available, so a number 
of adjustments to the 
data had to be 
undertaken to produce 
FTEs, and to obtain 
figures for coverage. 
1994-2001 Negative elasticity of 
labour demand with 
respect to changes in the 
MW for workers affected 
by the MW in West 
Australia of - 0.29, at 1% 
significance; Elasticity of 
demand was - 0.39 for 
younger workers. 
 
 
  
Australia Mangan and 
Johnston 1999 
Considers effect of 
state minimum wage 
levels upon 
employment of young 
people. 
State minimum 
differences over time 
and cross sectionally. 
The estimates appear 
to be appropriate, but 
the data set used in 
Model 2 was seen as 
potentially problematic 
by the authors 
themselves in terms of 
self-reporting of 
employment status. 
1980-1994/5 Estimated elasticities 
were all small and 
negative, aside from the 
elasticity for male FT 
employment, which was 
small and positive. 
Derived elasticities were - 
0.06 for FT employment, 
and - 0.04 for PT. 
For FT employment, 
small negative elasticities 
for all groups and for 
Australia and 
Queensland: For 
Queensland, the partial 
elasticity for FT 
employment was - 0.27 
(15-19 year-olds) and - 
0.28 (15-17 year-olds). 
For PT employment the 
only statistically 
significant result was - 
0.07 for 15-17 year-olds. 
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For Australia, the 
elasticity for FT 
employment was - 0.17 
(15-19 year-olds) and - 
0.05 (15-17 year-olds). 
For PT employment the 
only statistically 
significant result was - 
0.21 for 15-17 year-olds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia Junankar et al 
2000 
To critique prior work 
that aimed to 
generate wage 
elasticities for young 
workers, and to 
attempt their own 
estimates for 
Australia. 
Full data sources are 
indicated in an 
Appendix not available 
with the article. 
Implication in the paper 
is that all individuals in 
the selected 
occupational categories 
& industries were 
covered (average hours 
x all persons). 
 
1987-1997 38 equations run: on 
preferred specification, 
two elasticities deemed 
to have the appropriate 
sign and were statistically 
significant: for f/t 18 year-
old males in manuf. -3.1; 
for f/t females in retail -
2.05.  
  
New 
Zealand 
Chapple 1997 Considers impact of 
MW upon 
employment for those 
aged 20-24. 
Looks at workers aged 
between 20 and 24. 
The author notes the 
problem with using a 
short-time series, and 
the problems this poses 
for obtaining robust 
results.  
The unit chosen for the 
dependent variable was 
‘employment’ rather 
than ‘hours worked’: the 
latter would have been 
preferable as a 
measure of labour 
supply and demand, 
but HLFS contains a 
high level of proxy 
Time-series data for 
1980-1997, for 20-
24 year-olds 
No ‘robust significant 
impact of MWs on 
employment’ (Chapple, 
1997:26). The range of 
long-run elasticities is - 
0.177 to - 0.342, with the 
lowest in the preferred 
regression specification.  
On this basis ‘the 
hypothesis that the long-
run impact of MWs on 
youth employment is zero 
cannot be rejected’ 
(Chapple, 1997: 35). 
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reporting for the 20-24 
age group, with hours 
reported likely to be 
less accurate than 
employment status. 
New 
Zealand 
Pacheco 2007 The aim of the study 
is to determine which 
individuals earn the 
minimum wage or 
below it, in the light of 
the increases in the 
minimum wage and 
higher ‘bite’ than in 
some other countries 
– and notably the US. 
The HFLS is an 
appropriate survey as it 
is sufficiently large to 
capture minimum wage 
recipients, the 
incidence of which is 
relatively low. 
1997-2004. The 
period was broken 
down into two 
phases to observe 
changes in the 
demographic 
incidence of the 
MW: t-tests were 
conducted to 
establish whether 
the characteristics 
of affected workers 
were significantly 
different over the 
two periods. 
 
Age appears to be a 
critical determinant of 
whether any individual is 
receiving the MW. The 
increase of MW leads to 
an apparent fall in the 
proportion of affected 
workers with no 
qualifications. The 
proportion of MW 
recipients working full-
time fell for both groups. 
The groups are those 
earning above and below 
the minimum wage (from 
60-56% to 44-49%), with 
a fall in hours from 32-29 
to 26 hours (for both 
groups). 
 
  
New 
Zealand 
Pacheco and 
Cruickshank 
2007 
Economics research. 
The paper analyses 
the effects of 
minimum wages on 
educational 
enrolments of 16-24 
year-olds in New 
Zealand for the period 
1986-2004. The 
sample is sub-divided 
into 9 yearly cohorts 
in order to analyse 
age-specific effects. 
 
This data used would 
appear to address the 
weakness of the HLFS 
data used in Hyslop 
and Stillman: Pacheco 
and Cruickshank 
acknowledge that their 
method yields only yield 
‘apparent’ enrolment 
rates, as the method 
can lead to double-
counting where 
individuals are enrolled 
in more than one 
institution. An original 
sample survey might 
have dealt with the 
problem by estimating 
Time series data for 
1986-2004 
  Higher MWs 
have a ‘negative 
but insignificant 
effect’ on 
enrolment rates 
of 16-24 year-
olds as a whole 
(the elasticity of 
enrolment with 
respect to the 
MW is - 0.0909 
(10% increase in 
the MW will lead 
to a 0.909% fall 
in the number of 
individuals 
enrolled in 
education).  
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double-counting. The 
authors note, however, 
that the issue is likely to 
be consistent across all 
age groups. 
Three regression 
models are used: 
1) Linear model (S1) 
2) Model including age-
specific trends in 
enrolment rates (S2) 
3) Model incorporating 
labour market 
conditions on enrolment 
decisions, to take 
account of differential 
impact of the business 
cycle on different age 
groups, and associated 
enrolment decisions. 
S3 was generally 
preferred for the 
analysis and the 
coefficients cited below 
are taken from this 
specification. 
New 
Zealand 
Hyslop and 
Stillman 2007 
Policy research. 
In view of the fact that 
a large proportion of 
16 and 17 year-olds 
are paid at or near 
the minimum wage, 
and that half of all 
minimum wage 
recipients are 
between 18 and 24, 
there is a large policy 
interest in the impact 
of changes on a) 
employment levels b) 
school enrolments. 
Looks at introduction of 
higher minimums for 
16-17 year olds and 18-
19 year olds. New 
Zealand HLFS is based 
on a representative 
sample of c. 15,000 
households and 30,000 
individuals: statutory 
obligation to respond. 
The sample frame is 
based on an eight-
quarter rotating panel, 
with one-eighth of 
households rotating out 
each quarter. Survey 
collects data on labour 
The research 
covered the period 
1997-2003, based 
on data from the 
New Zealand 
Household Labour 
Force Survey. 
No immediate evidence 
of adverse effects on 
youth employment. 
Employment elasticities 
in relation to their 
specified changes in MW 
for 2003 are -0.1 to - 0.2 
for 16-17 year olds; and - 
0.04 for 18-19 year-olds. 
 
But they also enter a 
caveat about the 
negative elasticity finding 
and suggest that there is 
weak evidence for 
employment loss in the 
longer term. 
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force status, hours 
worked, educational 
status plus 
demographic 
information. Data on 
incomes is collected by 
supplementary 
questionnaire, the New 
Zealand Income Survey 
(HLFS-IS), with data 
collected annually each 
June. Samples used 
from HLFS and HLLS-
IS were not matched for 
individuals but separate 
extracts. 
 
 
UK Stewart 2002 Evaluates the impact 
on employment of the 
minimum wage 
introduction. 
All workers and various 
skill groups. Looks at 
the effect of the 
introduction of the 
minimum wage in 1999 
across geographic 
areas. Includes youths 
18-21 in analysis. Uses 
difference in difference 
methodology. 
1998-2000 Data 
taken from New 
Earnings Survey 
1998 and 2000; 
Labour Force 
Survey geographic 
area data; and 
Annual Business 
Inquiry 1998-1999. 
 
For youths only (18-21) 
impact estimate 
insignificantly different 
from zero, positive 
without area effects, 
negative with them. 
No lagged effects. Does 
not distinguish young 
workers from others in 
many of the estimates. 
 
  
UK Stewart 2004a Estimates the impact 
of the minimum wage 
on employment 
probabilities of low 
wage workers. 
Uses individual-level 
longitudinal data from 
matched surveys to 
compare the impact 
upon male and female 
adults and male and 
female young workers 
(18-21). Difference in 
difference 
methodology.   
1998-2000. Data 
from Labour Force 
Survey, New 
Earnings Survey 
and British 
Household Panel 
Survey.  
Finds impact to be 
insignificantly different 
from zero for all four 
demographic groups and 
all three datasets. 
Finding is robust to an 
extensive range of 
checks. Estimated effect 
found to be positive 
(although insignificant) 
for both both male groups 
and for young women in 
all cases. The estimated 
effect on adult women is 
negative in the LFS and 
  
140 
 
NES data but positive 
using the BHPS.  
UK Stewart 2004b Estimates impact of 
introduction of the 
minimum wage in 
1999 and subsequent 
upratings in 2000 and 
2001.  
Adult men and women 
22 and over; young 
men and women 18-21. 
Variation across 
workers at different 
points in the wage 
distribution. Uses 
difference in difference 
methodology. 
1994-2000. Data 
from 
New Earnings 
Survey 1994-2000; 
LFS March 1997-
March 2000; 
British Household 
Survey. Autumn 
1994 – 1999.  
No significant adverse 
effect on employment for 
any of the demographic 
groups examined. 
Elasticities more likely 
positive than negative but 
often insignificant. 
Introduction: 
Young men 0.15 to 0.51. 
Young women 0.79 to 
1.15. 
Upratings: 
Youths 0.07 to 1.09 
 No lagged effects. 
  
UK Dickens et al 
1999 
Considers the 
economic effects of 
minimum wages 
through experience of 
wages councils 
between 1975 and 
1992. Presents a 
theory of monopsony 
to explain findings. 
Uses New Earnings 
Survey data for Wages 
Council employees – 
unfortunately those 
under age 21 excluded 
from WC orders from 
1986 but adult rates 
continued to exert an 
effect on youth 
employment, so 
employment figures 
include young workers 
in the employment data 
for the whole period. 
For the wage variable 
the basic hourly wage 
is used. They use the 
ratio of the minimum to 
the average wage as 
the measure of impact 
of the wages councils 
upon the wage 
distribution (so called 
‘toughness’). 
1975 - 1992 
 
Minimum wages 
significantly compress 
the distribution of 
earnings but do not have 
a negative effect on 
employment. MW effects 
are positive (and 
significant) below levels 
of .55 and insignificant 
thereafter. 
 
  
UK Dickens et al 
2010 
The research for the 
Low Pay Commission 
examines the impact 
The LFS contains just 
over a thousand 21 
year olds each quarter 
LFS records are 
pooled over the 
period since the 
Positive and statistically 
significant employment 
effect at age 22 for low 
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of the labour market 
outcomes of young 
people.  Using the 
fact that those aged 
below 22 receive a 
different level of 
minimum wage, LFS 
data is used to 
examine changing 
labour market 
outcomes as 
individuals turn 22. 
The focus is on low-
skilled individuals but 
it also examines the 
impact on 
unemployment and 
inactivity. 
and a similar number of 
22 year olds.  The 
sample excludes full-
time students. It is 
composed of low skilled 
workers - defined as 
those whose highest 
qualifications are 
equivalent to GCSEs 
and those without 
qualifications. 
NMW was 
introduced – April 
1999 to March 
2009. 
skilled workers. 
France & 
USA 
Abowd et al 
1997 
Compares experience 
of France and USA in 
terms of effect of MW 
on employment. 
Both for France and the 
US identifiers were 
used to follow 
individuals from year to 
year, creating matched 
files (using INSEE 
research files for 
France and Census 
Bureau matching 
algorithm for US). 
Control variables 
consisted of education, 
potential labour force 
experience, race, 
marital status, region, 
and date of labour force 
entry. 
1981-1989 for 
France, 1981-1987 
for US 
 
French elasticities: men 
20-24: -1.2017 (p-value 
0.3451), women 20-24: -
1.2485 (p-value 0.1383) 
US elasticities: men 20-
24: -4.2095 (p-value 
0.0001), women 20-24: -
4.8644 (p-value 0.0001) 
  
France Bazen and 
Martin 1991 
It argues that the 
conventional Mincer 
equation model to 
estimate employment 
effects is not an 
appropriate one. An 
alternative model 
based on the theory 
Annual labour force 
survey (Enquête sur 
l’emploi) from INSEE 
(French national 
statistical agency).  
 
Time series data 
1963-1986 
 
Increases in the real 
value of the SMIC exert 
significant upward 
pressure on real youth 
earnings.  
Employment elasticity is 
between -0.1 and -0.23 
for youths. For adults 
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of labour demand is 
developed and used. 
elasticity is small and 
insignificant. Real wage 
elasticity for young 
people (15-24) is 0.37. 
France Benhayoun 
1994 
Considers effect of 
MW on young 
people’s employment 
INSEE data source.  
 
1974-1991 
 
A relation between the 
MW and young persons' 
employment seems to 
exist but is very fragile 
(statistically not 
significant). This lack of 
robustness leads the 
author to conclude that 
introducing sub-MW rates 
for young people is not a 
good idea. 
  
Spain Cebrian et al 
2010 
The aim of the paper 
is to estimate the 
effects of the rise in 
the minimum wage on 
employment. 
The study draws up 
different data sets 
which seem to be the 
most comprehensive 
sources of information 
available in Spain. All of 
these data sets are 
incorporated in the 
analysis through 
different means. 
The paper covers 
two different time 
serial:  
1) Estimation of the 
effects of the rise in 
minimum wage on 
employment based 
on Encuesta de 
Coyuntural Laboral 
(ECL) covers the 
period 2000-2008  
2) Estimation of the 
effects of the rise in 
minimum wage on 
employment based 
on aggregated data 
from Encuesta de 
Poblacion Activa 
(EPA) covers the 
period 1981-2009. 
A small negative effect 
on Kaitz Index (KI) and 
the level of employment 
in Spanish firms and a 
null effect on the 
employment rate, even in 
the case of teenagers. 
 
  
Spain Dolado et al 
1996 
Considers impact of 
disproportionate 
increases in the MW 
on employment of 
young workers aged 
16-19. 
Looks at variation on 
effects of minimum 
wage across industries 
where minimum wage 
most applied. Looks at 
the effect of the 
differential increase for 
16 year olds compared 
Young workers 
aged 16-19. Data 
from Contalidad 
Nacional Sectorial 
Analyses large increases 
for 16 year olds and more 
modest increase for 17 
year olds in 1990. 
Negative relationship 
between change in 
teenage employment rate 
and share initially low-
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to 17 year olds in 1990. paid but not for 20-24 
year olds.  
Spain Gonzalez 
Guemes 1997 
Academic research. The study is primarily 
based on Encuesta de 
Población Activa (EPA) 
[Economically Active 
Population Survey] 
which is the most 
comprehensive source 
of statistical information 
on employment 
available in Spain. 
It is not clear what the 
sample size is other 
than the fact that 8 non-
agricultural economic 
activities were included 
in the study. 
The econometric 
analysis conducted 
covered two 
different time 
periods: 1976-1995 
and 1981-1992. 
The reason for 
choosing these two 
time periods is that 
there were several 
methodological 
variations in the 
Encuesta de 
Población Activa 
(EPA) 
(Economically 
Active Population 
Survey) which 
made estimations 
very difficult. 
A rise in the MW has a 
negative effect on 
employment particularly 
on the employment of 
teenagers (16-19). 
  
Spain Perez 
Dominguez et 
al 2002 
Academic research. 
Its central aim is to 
‘consider the explicit 
possibility’ that 
changes on the 
interprofessional 
minimum wage (SIM) 
may simultaneously 
affect the three key 
aspects of the 
adolescent labour 
market: employment, 
level of activity and 
unemployment rate. 
The study is based on 
data generated by two 
of the most 
comprehensive sources 
of statistical information 
available in Spain: 1) 
Encuesta de Población 
Activa (EPA) 
(Economically Active 
Population Survey), to 
analyse variables of 
teenager employment, 
activity and 
unemployment rate; 
and 2) Encuesta de 
Salarios en la Industria 
y los Servicios 
(Manufacturing and 
Service Industries 
Wage Survey) to 
analyse wages. 
Data utilised to 
make the 
estimations covered 
from 1981 (fifth 
trimester) to 1999 
(fourth trimester 
included). 
The effect of a rise in the 
MW on teenagers’ 
employment is negative 
and significant; a rise in 
the MW would reduce 
teenager participation in 
the labour market and 
would generate a global 
increase in the teenager 
unemployment rate. 
 
  
144 
 
Spain Gonzalez 
Guemes  and 
Perez 
Dominguez 
2002 
This is a short review 
paper which 
compares some key 
trends relating the 
minimum wages 
observed in Spain 
and other OECD 
countries in Europe, 
and the US. These 
trends and indicators 
include: general 
characteristics of 
minimum wage 
regulations, Kaitz 
Index and elasticity of 
employment on 
different age groups 
following changes in 
minimum wages. 
The study is based on 
analysis of both primary 
and secondary sources 
which are very well 
known and widely 
quoted in the Spanish 
context. 
Data utilised to 
make the 
estimations on 
evolution of the 
Inter-professional 
minimum wage 
covered from 1963 
to 1997.  
Data utilised to 
make the 
estimations on the 
process of 
convergence of SIM 
by age groups 
observed in Spain 
covered from 1977 
to 1998. 
Comparison of the 
Kaitz Index for 
different OECD 
countries focused 
on the period 1992-
1995 – presumably 
the year taken for 
each country (e.g. 
1995 for Spain) 
depended upon the 
availability of 
information on the 
KI for the country in 
question. 
Wage regulations, 
specifically those on the 
MW, could have negative 
effects on the 
employment of 
individuals who 
commonly work on MW 
arrangements, notably 
teenagers. 
  
Spain Blazquez et al 
2009 
Academic publication. 
The paper aims to 
examine the effect of 
the minimum wage on 
youth employment in 
Spain. It takes into 
account both existing 
regional differences 
and the dynamic 
behaviour of 
employment. 
 
The study is based on 
up to date and 
comprehensive sources 
of statistical information 
on employment 
available in Spain. 
The paper mainly 
covers the 2000-
2008 period, 
although the 
evolution of 
minimum wages (by 
age group and 
amount) is analysed 
from 1990 to 2008 
 
The MW has a positive 
and significant effect on 
youth employment; 
however, this effect is no 
longer clear once the 
quarterly lag is included 
into the estimates. 
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Greece Karageorgiou 
2004 
Academic research 
motivated by the 
influence of minimum 
wages on teenage 
and youth 
employment in 
Greece. 
Looks at variation 
between 15-19 year 
olds and 20-24 year 
olds relative to average 
adult wages. Uses 
Greek Labour Force 
Survey, Government 
Statistical Yearbook 
and UN data plus 
OECD data. 
OECD data 1974-
2001 for young 
adults; 1981-2000 
for teenagers.  
Elasticities:  
15-19 0.22 to 0.63 (larger 
estimates significant) 
 20-24 0.22-0.63 
(insignificant). 
 
  
Portugal  Pereira 2003 Considers company 
decisions in light of 
MW to employ young 
people  
The study uses a 
natural experiment to 
look at company 
decisions on which age 
groups to employ, by 
looking at the relative 
employment levels of 
the three age groups, 
assuming initially that in 
the absence of a MW 
wage effect, all three 
groups would 
experience a similar 
movement in 
employment. In 
addition, the study 
looks at possible 
substitution of workers 
in the 20-25 group for 
those in the 18-19 
group, on usual human 
capital assumptions, 
with the 30-35 group as 
a reference. 
The study uses 
panel data for the 
period 1985-1989, 
using waves with 
data collected in 
March each year: 
the data mainly 
covers the period 
1986-88, and was 
designed to exclude 
anticipated 
adjustments by 
companies before 
the change on 1 
January 1987. 
Employment/MW 
Elasticity is - 0.2 to - 0.4. 
  
Portugal Portugal and 
Cardoso 2006 
Academic research 
with policy relevance.  
Looks at the effect of 
MW on employment 
of young people. 
The period chosen puts 
the paper in the ‘natural 
experiment’ paradigm. 
The data source is 
good quality, and 
inspection of wage 
distribution suggests 
high compliance with 
the minimum wage, 
1986-1989 Main effect is in the 
relationship between the 
change in the MW and 
the share of teenagers in 
the flow or hiring and 
separations. Rising rate 
of employment by young 
people was ‘driven 
mainly by a decline in job 
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meaning that the MW 
increase is applied to 
the full sample and that 
any net employment 
effects are not the 
result of non-
compliance. 
separations’ (ibid. 1008), 
possibly attributable to 
‘firing costs’ and ‘sunk 
hiring costs’ (ibid.) 
Postulate of  an ‘inaction 
band’ or period, during 
which a firm will not react 
to changes in factor 
prices. However, the 
hiring of teenagers fell, 
suggesting that where 
these costs are not 
present, firms will 
respond in line with 
classical predictions. 
Portugal Cardoso 2009 Academic research 
with policy relevance. 
Tests relationship 
between exposure to 
MW in youth and 
subsequent pay level 
and rate of growth, in 
part as proxy for 
training & experience. 
Administrative 
longitudinal data on all 
workers and their firms 
gathered annually by 
the Employment 
Ministry Data covers 
age, gender, schooling, 
occupation, seniority, 
earnings and hours of 
work. Individuals can 
be tracked via an 
identification code. 
1987-2005. 
Workers aged 14-
20 as of March 
1987 were tracked 
for the whole period 
(up until age 32-38). 
Relation of MW exposure 
and tenure to pay. 
For workers in the same 
firm, there is a 5% wage 
premium after 1 year’s 
exposure, rising to 13% 
for exposure of 5 years. 
Tenure has a strongly 
positive effect on the 
steepness of earnings’ 
rises for tenure up to 13 
years: coefficients for 
returns to tenure from 
+0.031 at 1 year to max. 
+0.196 at 13 years, then 
declining but positive). 
Exposure to youth 
minimum wages 
can have a 
positive impact on 
longer-term 
wages in terms of 
a wage premium, 
but appears to be 
correlated with 
lower earnings 
growth (less steep 
tenure profile). 
Implies that firms 
might offer less 
formal firm-
specific training to 
MW workers, but 
that general skills 
increase through 
job upgrading. 
 
Netherlands Dolado et al 
1996 
 Looks at the effects of 
fall in youth sub-
minimums relative to 
adult minimum in 1981 
and 1983. Covers 
young workers 17-22 
Labour Market 
Survey 1979-1985 
No elasticities provided. 
Positive effect. Youth 
employment improved or 
fell by less over the 
period in occupations 
with most young, 
unskilled workers, 
relative to overall 
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changes in youth 
employment.  
Netherlands Van Soest 
1994 
The main purpose of 
the paper was to 
check whether the 
decrease of the 
minimum wage would 
have had effects on 
employment and 
unemployment of 
youngsters. 
 
Looks at reduction in 
youth sub-minimum. 
The data are mainly 
gathered by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS). 
The size of the data is 
broad: means for whole 
population of 
employees, where 
youngsters are 
compared with. This 
broad approach has a 
downside as the policy 
and decisions – 
considerations - to 
employ employees is 
not looked at. 
1972-1992. Specific 
micro-evidence is 
analysed for the 
period 1984-1987. 
Finds no clear evidence 
for an impact of lowering 
of the MW on 
employment and 
unemployment levels. It 
concludes that it is not 
clear whether 
employment has 
improved or whether 
substitution effects have 
taken place. Reference is 
made to an unpublished, 
mimeo Dutch study by 
De Koning and 
Gedlderbloom published 
in Dutch by the OSA in 
1990 where it was shown 
that after wages were 
reduced, more long-term 
unemployed were hired – 
although with 
government subsidies. 
Overall, the reduction of 
the MW seemed, 
however, not to stimulate 
the creation of more jobs.  
  
Finland Böckerman 
and Uusitalo  
2009 
Research Academic. 
Considers the effect 
of MW on 
employment of young 
people. 
Employers’ payroll data 
used.  
Employment, pay within 
two groups: those 
under 25 who could be 
paid below MW and 
those slightly older who 
could not. 
1993-1995 There was no 
employment effect, i.e. 
the temporary policy of 
suspending the MW did 
not boost employment 
among the young worker 
group that it was 
intended to benefit.  In 
fact, there was a very 
small positive 
employment effect on the 
group whose wages were 
not reduced. 
  
